Secs. 52-573 and 52-574. Limitation on contracts under seal. Actions on agreements to sell real estate. Sections 52-573 and 52-574 are repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 8313; 1949, S. 3232d; 1959, P.A. 574, S. 7; February, 1965, P.A. 401, S. 2; 1971, P.A. 18, S. 2.)
Sec. 52-575. Entry upon land to be made within fifteen years. (a) No person shall make entry into any lands or tenements but within fifteen years next after his right or title to the same first descends or accrues or within fifteen years next after such person or persons have been ousted from possession of such land or tenements; and every person, not entering as aforesaid, and his heirs, shall be utterly disabled to make such entry afterwards; and no such entry shall be sufficient, unless within such fifteen-year period, any person or persons claiming ownership of such lands and tenements and the right of entry and possession thereof against any person or persons who are in actual possession of such lands or tenements, gives notice in writing to the person or persons in possession of the land or tenements of the intention of the person giving the notice to dispute the right of possession of the person or persons to whom such notice is given and to prevent the other party or parties from acquiring such right, and the notice being served and recorded as provided in sections 47-39 and 47-40 shall be deemed an interruption of the use and possession and shall prevent the acquiring of a right thereto by the continuance of the use and possession for any length of time thereafter, provided an action is commenced thereupon within one year next after the recording of such notice. The limitation herein prescribed shall not begin to run against the right of entry of any owner of a remainder or reversionary interest in real estate, which is in the adverse possession of another, until the expiration of the particular estate preceding such remainder or reversionary estate.
(b) If any person who has such right or title of entry into any lands or tenements is, at the time of the first descending or accruing of such right or title, a minor, non compos mentis or imprisoned, he and his heirs may, notwithstanding the expiration of such fifteen years, make such entry and serve and record such notice at any time within five years next after full age, coming of sound mind or release from prison, or his heirs shall, within five years after his death, make such entry and serve and record such notice, and take benefit of the same.
(1949 Rev., S. 8314; P.A. 96-249, S. 13, 14.)
History: P.A. 96-249 divided section into Subsecs. and in Subsec. (a) added provision re interruption of possession, effective June 6, 1996.
Section is substantially copied from the English statute, 21 Jac. 1, Ch. 6, Sec. 1, except that it reduces the time for reentry from 20 to 15 years; history of statute. 75 C. 533. Right of entry does not accrue to, nor statute begin to run against, the heirs of a femme covert, during the life of her husband, if tenant by the curtesy. 3 C. 193; 5 C. 235, 236; 29 C. 136, see 1 R. 547. In barring rights of entry, actions of ejectment are barred; 2 R. 512; and also bills to redeem a mortgage. 2 R. 512. If one of the several tenants who are disseized is within the statutory exceptions, it does not avail the others. 4 D. 273; Id., 466; 5 D. 218. Disabilities accruing after right of entry accrues are not within the exceptions. 2 C. 27. The 5 years, allowed in case of disability, may sometimes be part of the 15 years. 3 C. 244. Statute runs against private right of owner of land within an alleged highway. 50 C. 213, 214. A statute of limitation does not run against the state. 56 C. 517. Statute begins to run when owner is in fact disseized whether under a disability or not, but additional time is allowed after removal of disability. 74 C. 111, 112. When right to redeem a mortgage barred. 76 C. 146; Id., 227; 81 C. 442; 84 C. 56. Applied by analogy to right of administrator to sell land under order of court. 7 Wheat. 59. Section will ordinarily be followed, by analogy, in foreclosure actions. 131 C. 39. Cited. 112 C. 368; 132 C. 622; 182 C. 272; 214 C. 464.
Adverse possession. Rules strictly construed. 29 C. 398. Gives fee simple after 15 years, unless one of exceptions of statute apply. 5 C. 298; 14 C. 290; 19 C. 475. Constructive possession will not satisfy requirement of actual possession; 8 C. 443; as where it is by license; 5 D. 187; 38 C. 520; or under a contract. 1 R. 245. As between husband and wife; 76 C. 223; mortgagor and mortgagee; 47 C. 496; 76 C. 146; Id., 223; principal and agent; 77 C. 578; life tenant and reversioner; 70 C. 349; 76 C. 595; one entitled to dower, to whom it is not assigned, and heirs. 90 C. 133. Disability from infancy. 74 C. 111. Does not run against the state; 56 C. 517; but that state has claim to land of no consequence between individual claimants; 95 C. 619; nor against assessment lien; 79 C. 38; nor against public, but public may abandon right; 73 C. 581; and the same rule applies to railroad right-of-way. 86 C. 275. Necessary elements. 74 C. 107; 84 C. 569; 101 C. 412; 104 C. 605; 105 C. 355; 119 C. 287; 137 C. 40; 142 C. 398; 148 C. 158. If title of another is recognized, possession no longer adverse. 81 C. 547. Adverse user is use as one's own. 83 C. 627. Possession under belief that one is owner may suffice. 81 C. 133. No necessity of claiming title. 74 C. 111; 84 C. 569; 108 C. 5. Presumption of knowledge by owner from possession. 74 C. 107; 82 C. 437. Mere exclusive possession not enough. 78 C. 128; 75 C. 522; 82 C. 653. When possession under oral gift is sufficient. 13 C. 235; 21 C. 416; 39 C. 96; 103 C. 354. Effect of deed subsequently given, conveying less than fee. 81 C. 539; 83 C. 360. Possession under void deed; 3 C. 246; 35 C. 437; 39 C. 97; 90 C. 241; effect of terms of deed. 81 C. 546. Possession under oral exchange. 82 C. 437. As applied to cornice jutting over land; 75 C. 663; 78 C. 405; to division wall. 79 C. 457. Occupation and use of land as evidence; 74 C. 107; 77 C. 28; 85 C. 159; erection of building, fence or wall; 69 C. 15; 71 C. 254; 86 C. 545; 88 C. 688; 109 C. 452; payment of taxes; 80 C. 338; color of title; ancient deeds. 71 C. 555; 88 C. 521. Accepting lease as rebutting claim of adverse user. 79 C. 493. Tacking together rights of successive disseizors; 3 D. 259; 31 C. 531; but they must be in same chain of title. 86 C. 699. A casual or stealthy reentry will not avail owner. 32 C. 498. Is ordinarily a question of fact. 83 C. 500; 89 C. 359; 90 C. 133; 99 C. 67; 105 C. 725, but see 95 C. 619. By an heir, as against right of administrator to sell land under order of court. 7 Wheat. 59. Disclaimer. 92 C. 546. By one cotenant against others; of island little visited. 95 C. 619. Possession under subsisting contract for purchase of title, when adverse. 106 C. 301. Adverse possession of fee must be against everyone; of easement, only against general public. 105 C. 728. Church society maintaining horse sheds on disputed land held to have acquired it by adverse possession. 103 C. 336. Applies only to the acquiring of title to land by adverse possession. 136 C. 277. Claim of right and an intent by possessor to use property as his own are among essential elements. 137 C. 40. Entry must be made within 15 years and an action must be commenced and prosecuted to effect within 1 year after entry. Id., 205. Plaintiff alleged title by adverse possession; defendant's demurrer stated cause of action barred by statute; demurrer without merit because plaintiff alleged he remained in possession to date of complaint. 138 C. 102. Conclusion of court that title by adverse possession had not been proved, sustained. Id., 690. Cited. 139 C. 220; 141 C. 198. Exclusive possession not met if dominion over property is shared with other users. 154 C. 194. Where deeds of claimant and his predecessors in title expressly excepted strip of land claimed and neither his grantor nor predecessor grantor had orally conveyed excepted strip, connection between successive adverse claimants necessary to successful acquisition of title by tacking successive adverse possessions held lacking. 155 C. 327. Sporadic trespasses should not be construed as ousting the owner-neighbor of possession, especially where there was no open and notorious possession. 158 C. 510. Adverse possession against cotenants and daughters; may be based on fraudulently obtained, void probate decree; nature of possession required, role of “color of title”; section discussed. 171 C. 149. Two permits granted to defendant authorizing construction of a dock did not vest title in defendant or defendant's predecessors or allow defendant to bypass the requirements of adverse possession in section, nor did they render futile defendant's ability to assert a claim of right to adversely possess plaintiff's littoral area. 300 C. 297.
Prescription. Statute applies by analogy; nature of prescriptive right. 2 C. 607; 75 C. 522. Cannot give right to maintain nuisance. 69 C. 668; 72 C. 531; 83 C. 417. Community cannot acquire, to right-of-way. 78 C. 130. By city for sewer. 81 C. 137. Implies grant. 78 C. 132. User under deed cannot be basis for; 72 C. 188; but user may originate in contract or equitable right. 8 C. 137; 90 C. 241. Whether user is under license or claim of right question of fact. 78 C. 156; 89 C. 359; 96 C. 680; 105 C. 725. Must be reasonable. 83 C. 424. Elements. Id., 624; 90 C. 241; 105 C. 725. Imputing knowledge to owner. 81 C. 137; 87 C. 31. Building or eaves jutting over land. 75 C. 664; 78 C. 401; 87 C. 31; 89 C. 359. Diversion of water. 69 C. 668; 83 C. 611. Right to discharge surface water, not lost by 10 years' use of intercepting ditch. 83 C. 59. Right to acquire lateral support by, quaere. 82 C. 126. Cannot be acquired as to secret tunnel beneath way. 87 C. 31. Fire escapes jutting over line. 92 C. 546. Underground sewer. 96 C. 676. Loss of easement by prescription; elements. 104 C. 140, 596. Abutter on highway cannot acquire prescriptive right to maintain encroachments therein. Id., 619. Right-of-way cannot be acquired over route of public highway unless discontinued or abandoned. Id., 391. Adverse user need be only exclusive as against public; change of user from horse-drawn to motor driven vehicles does not break period. 105 C. 728. User must be sufficiently open to put owner on notice. 108 C. 24. Lessee in possession cannot prescribe in himself; unless lease is effective to cover right-of-way, lessee's adverse use of the way cannot enure to lessor's benefit. 121 C. 638.
Cited. 3 CA 602; 6 CA 187; 10 CA 669; 13 CA 518; 15 CA 458; 35 CA 398. When not claimed under color of title, adverse possession is limited to the area of land actually possessed; it can only extend as far as the claimant has actually occupied and possessed the land in dispute. 121 CA 748.
Cited. 15 CS 467.
Driveway openly used in common by adjoining property owners for more than 15 years resulted in prescriptive right of plaintiff to such use and defendants were ordered to remove a newly installed fence. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 360.
Sec. 52-575a. Action to enforce recorded private restrictions or notations on maps. No action or any other type of court proceeding shall be brought to enforce a private restriction recorded in the land records of the municipality in which the property is located or a notation on a filed map pertaining to the use of privately owned land, the type of structures that may be erected thereon or the location of same unless such action or proceeding shall be commenced within three years of the time that the person seeking to enforce such restriction had actual or constructive knowledge of such violation. This section shall be deemed not to apply to any private restriction or notation pertaining to (a) any public utility easement; (b) any right-of-way; (c) any park or open space land; (d) any private driveway, roadway or street, or (e) any sewer line or water line.
(1972, P.A. 283; P.A. 73-93; P.A. 90-169.)
History: P.A. 73-93 substituted “the party seeking to enforce such restriction” for “such party” for clarity; P.A. 90-169 replaced “a recorded private restriction” with “a private restriction recorded in the land records of the municipality in which the property is located”.
Cited. 214 C. 464.
Plaintiff's claim not barred by 3-year statute of limitations because provisions in covenant document that defined restrictions on two lots owned by defendants evinced an intent that restrictions were for the benefit of view easements over such lots for the benefit of lot owned by plaintiffs, and were not merely private restrictions. 141 CA 238.
Sec. 52-576. Actions for account or on simple or implied contracts. (a) No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Any person legally incapable of bringing any such action at the accruing of the right of action may sue at any time within three years after becoming legally capable of bringing the action.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to actions upon judgments of any court of the United States or of any court of any state within the United States, or to any cause of action governed by article 2 of title 42a.
(1949 Rev., S. 8315; 1959, P.A. 574, S. 8; 1971, P.A. 18, S. 1; P.A. 82-160, S. 246.)
History: 1959 act deleted exception for nonnegotiable promissory notes and added provision re article 2 of title 42a; 1971 act referred to any “contract in writing” rather than to “any contract in writing not under seal”; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.
See Sec. 17b-122 re reimbursement of town by pauper.
Statute of limitations does not apply to continuing trusts. 33 C. 76; 102 C. 302; 104 C. 189. It applies to collecting agents. 32 C. 540. A book debt, if not recoverable in an action of book debt, by reason of statute, is not recoverable at all; 5 C. 342; unless there has been a new accounting. 6 C. 248. Where action at law is barred, one in equity will generally be also. 32 C. 538. Day on which note matures should be excluded in computing the 6 years. 43 C. 57. Note made by life legatee to testator and distributed to maker is not barred; his continued life use amounts to a payment of interest. 46 C. 443, 444. Section applies to money demand on executed simple contract. Id., 142. Statute begins to run against demand note from its date. Id., 437. Suit seasonably commenced but abated by defendant's death arrests running of statute. Id., 440. Implied trusts are within statute. 33 C. 77; 59 C. 156. Payment of interest on mortgage keeps claim alive, although the mortgage is afterward discovered to be invalid. 53 C. 180. Statute will not begin to run until there is someone who can sue and be sued; parties cannot defer the running of statute by their own laches. 61 C. 451. Action against guarantor of a nonnegotiable note is governed by this section and not by Sec. 52-573. 66 C. 461. It is a good defense to a claim made as a set-off, that it is barred by statute. 49 C. 92. If claim be barred, mechanic's lien to secure it cannot be enforced. 50 C. 271. Statutes de settlement of estates supersede general statutes of limitation. Id.; 52 C. 141. Does not run in favor of husband as statutory trustee of wife. 55 C. 221. When claim barred by statute may still be used in recoupment. Id., 432. Laches not to be imputed to one who sues within statutory period. Id., 578. When statute runs against a resulting trust. 62 C. 408. A domestic judgment is not included in section. 74 C. 656. Statute runs against claim for services to decedent rendered more than 6 years before death unless rendered on promise to pay by will. 80 C. 19; 82 C. 651; 83 C. 38. Where deceased promised to pay for services by will, right of action does not accrue until death, even where suit is on quantum meruit; 121 C. 97; same where deceased promised only heir to pay by not making will. 96 C. 384. When statute begins to run on demand note. 75 C. 431; 78 C. 267; 84 C. 55. A tax is not within section. 85 C. 378. Effect of failure to get order limiting time to present claims against an estate, where debtor dies. 75 C. 408. Action on endorsement of note not an action on note. 66 C. 457. In action on implied contract for use of land, treating possession as tenancy from year to year will not remove bar. 77 C. 7. When action for breach of contract accrues; 86 C. 494; advances by partner; 68 C. 459; settlement of partnership accounts; 68 C. 457; where payments are credited on account. 70 C. 434; 125 C. 199. Statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. 114 C. 170. Each item of a series of charges for services may be separate debt for purposes of statute. 129 C. 541; 134 C. 259. When applied to suit against surgeon for breach of implied contract to use reasonable care and skill. 103 C. 720, see 119 C. 507; 127 C. 386; 134 C. 259. Cited. 110 C. 414; 112 C. 368; 137 C. 691; 139 C. 220; 149 C. 326. Right of action on demand note accrues upon its execution and delivery. 116 C. 559. Due bill barred by section. 124 C. 294. Statute applies to wife's claim for support. 124 C. 547. Applies to action by employee to recover overtime pay and liquidated damages under federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 134 C. 246. Distinguished from Sec. 52-581; this section applies to executed parol contracts. Id., 259. Does not apply to action by municipality to recover assessment of benefits. 131 C. 50. Nor to statutory action by one town against another for reimbursement of expense of educating children. 132 C. 203. But applies to action by policeman against city to recover salary withheld. 134 C. 260. History of statute. Id., 266. Proof of existence and performance of contract unenforceable because statute of frauds is a sufficient answer to defense of statute of limitations, by showing that no action brought earlier could be maintained. Id., 536. Applies to executed contracts. Id., 585. Ignorance that damage has been done does not prevent running of statute, except where there is something tantamount to fraudulent concealment of cause of action. 135 C. 176. Court's finding that debt was barred, not supported by evidence. 136 C. 187. An unconditional promise to pay will not be implied if the acknowledgment of indebtedness, even though unequivocal, is accompanied by a conditional promise to pay; in such a situation the indebtedness remains barred until the condition has been met. 144 C. 403. Burden of proof on plaintiff to remove bar of statute; defense can be lost by an unequivocal acknowledgment or recognition of debt or payment on account. 145 C. 300. Statute of limitations was tolled because, although defendant stopped making specified payments provided for in support contract, he did provide money for the child's support which he intended to go toward the fulfillment of his contractual obligation. 153 C. 671. Cited. 165 C. 410. When plaintiff's performance of oral contract has been completely executed, this section and not Sec. 52-581 establishes applicable limitation period. 170 C. 243. Amended complaint which did not allege a new cause of action related back to date of complaint and thus claims therein were not barred by statute. 177 C. 191. Statute not applicable where plaintiff's attorney was legally incapable of bringing action; applies only to the contractual party. Id., 281. Cited. 178 C. 258; Id., 529; 184 C. 558; 191 C. 150; Id., 194; 192 C. 732; 196 C. 509; 199 C. 683; 205 C. 219; 210 C. 734; 214 C. 464; 228 C. 436; 233 C. 474; 239 C. 284; 240 C. 287. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, i.e. no time runs against the king, exempts state from operation of section. 307 C. 412. Statute of limitations for tort action and not breach of contract action applies to claims against defendant law firm where complaint contained no allegation that defendant breached specific contract provision and relied on language typically used in negligence cases. 311 C. 282.
Cited. 1 CA 7. Statute is not tolled pending appointment of an administrator or executor. Id., 535. Creditor is entitled to compensation under an insurance policy loss payable clause even though his right to bring suit against debtor has been extinguished by running of statute of limitations. Id., 595. Where plaintiff filed an amended complaint listing additional defects in construction of new house, the identity of the cause of action remained the same so that the 6-year contract statute of limitations applied and the court properly allowed the amendment in its discretion. Id., 652. Cited. 3 CA 250; Id., 602; 5 CA 293. Right of action accrued upon completion of services rendered. Id., 465. Cited. 6 CA 212; 11 CA 375; 12 CA 529; 17 CA 159; 30 CA 803; 33 CA 702; 34 CA 395; Id., 732; 39 CA 289; 42 CA 426; 43 CA 435; 45 CA 466. Section's 6-year statute of limitations applied to executed oral contract, as opposed to 3-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-581 which applies only to executory contracts. 76 CA 599. If a legal malpractice case is not ripe for adjudication until damage caused by alleged malpractice becomes evident upon final judgment in the underlying action, statute is tolled until such final judgment is rendered. 89 CA 690.
Time when statute begins to run. 3 CS 209. Cited. 5 CS 205. “I will take care of it as soon as I can” takes debt out of statute. 7 CS 48. Cited. Id., 145. Applies to action for recovery of loan not evidenced in writing and loan not signed by borrower. 8 CS 264. Cited. Id., 363. The law of the locus rather than the forum governs statute of limitations. 9 CS 399. A payment to toll statute of limitations must be made or authorized by the debtor. 10 CS 371. Claim of physician not barred by statute of limitations because it was found to be an open running account. Id., 494. Payment of interest and principal by grantee of the equity of redemption does not keep statute of limitation from tolling against the liability of the mortgagor on the note. 11 CS 461. Cited. 12 CS 286. Does not apply to a town's right to reimbursement under Sec. 10-253; history. 13 CS 58. Cited. Id., 174. When services have been rendered by police officers, an implied contract to pay them arises and statute of limitations for contracts is applicable. 14 CS 130. Distinction between legal damage and apparent damage. Id., 464. Cited. 17 CS 61. There is no statute of limitations regarding domestic judgments; the prima facie presumption of payment, which arises after 20 years, presents the only limitation of time to the collection of a domestic judgment. Id., 134. Where plaintiff alleges promise by defendant's intestate during his lifetime to pay for services out of his estate, cause of action does not accrue until intestate's death. 18 CS 133. Statute should not be passed upon by demurrer to complaint unless matters in avoidance of it have been voluntarily inserted in complaint. 19 CS 85. Institution of arbitration proceedings not the bringing of “action” under statute. 25 CS 76. Cited. 28 CS 162; 29 CS 501. Applied retroactively, absent express intent to the contrary. 30 CS 596. Mental incompetence does not toll the 6-year limitation, but imprisonment may. 31 CS 46. Cited. 34 CS 22; 35 CS 199. Applicable where plaintiff's performance was completely executed, in contrast to applicability of Sec. 52-501 to executory contracts. 37 CS 735. Cited. 39 CS 458; 42 CS 348; 44 CS 207. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi does not operate to exempt state from statute of limitations. 51 CS 265.
In order for statute of limitation to be available as a defense, it must be pleaded; if a party fails to plead it, he is deemed to have waived it and plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding that the period has run. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 569, 571. Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 366, 367.
Statute of limitations does not begin to run on claim for underinsured benefits until tortfeasor's liability limits have been exhausted. 251 C. 106. Re claim for uninsured motorist benefits, statute of limitations does not begin to run until plaintiff knew or should have known the tortfeasor was uninsured, and in this case plaintiff could not have known the tortfeasor was uninsured until she received answers to her interrogatories which thereby put her on notice there was no insurance coverage for the accident. 255 C. 601.
Where arbitration clause in insurance policy meant underinsured motorist claimant could not maintain an action against provider until all underlying insurance was exhausted, right of action did not accrue, and statute of limitations did not begin, until that time. 49 CA 653. Accrual date or date that plaintiff properly could have maintained an action against defendant was date when plaintiff was notified of lack of insurance coverage and not date of the accident. 54 CA 724. In a claim for attorney's fees, where plaintiff attorney continued to represent defendant client's interests, statute of limitations did not begin to toll until attorney's motion to withdraw his appearance had been granted. 72 CA 158. Waiver of statute of limitations included as a delay in enforcement clause at the inception of a mortgage note is void and unenforceable. 84 CA 675. Continuous representation doctrine not applicable to contract for architectural services; statute not tolled where contract divided payment into monthly segments and breach of contract occurred at the time of each nonpayment. 148 CA 728. An action on a third-party guarantee agreement accrues on the date the third-party guarantee agreement becomes due and payable. 198 CA 136.
When debtor defaults on obligation payable in installments, statute of limitations on installments due in the future does not run until installment becomes due or irreversible acceleration of the debt occurs. 45 CS 325.
Sec. 52-577. Action founded upon a tort. No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.
(1949 Rev., S. 8316.)
See Sec. 52-555 re actions for injuries resulting in death.
See Sec. 52-584 re limitation of action for injury to person or property caused by negligence, misconduct or malpractice.
When right of action accrues. 26 C. 334. Applies to action for a fire communicated by a locomotive engine. 56 C. 24. Statute runs in favor of bank directors who have been negligent in control of bank. 89 C. 475. Action by lower riparian proprietor for pollution of stream is within section. 80 C. 185. History of section. 82 C. 580. When statute begins to run in favor of an administrator. 90 C. 569. Relation of this section to Sec. 52-584. 91 C. 36. Prior to barring of alienation of affections action, recovery could be had for loss of consortium occurring within statutory period. 117 C. 213; 133 C. 662, 663. Applied to action for fraudulent confinement. 123 C. 651. Action against officer and director of corporation for breach of duty to corporation and stockholders is within statute. 129 C. 674. Under Sec. 52-590, limitation begins to run when defendant moves into state. 131 C. 675. Cited. 149 C. 326. Limitation applicable to all actions founded upon a tort which do not fall within those causes of action enumerated in Sec. 52-584 or another section; tort of invasion of plaintiffs' usufructuary and property rights in diversion of waters of stream is within limitation. 155 C. 477. Cited. 159 C. 502; 162 C. 247; 168 C. 329. Action based on strict liability must, by section, be brought within 3 years of date of sale of product claim to be defective, and an allegation of continuing failure to warn of product's claimed danger does not alter that requirement. 170 C. 289. Cited. 178 C. 258; 180 C. 230; 183 C. 504; 189 C. 162; 190 C. 8; 191 C. 150; 192 C. 327. Must be pleaded as a special defense. 197 C. 9. Cited. 198 C. 660; 202 C. 57; Id., 234; 204 C. 303; 205 C. 1; Id., 93; 207 C. 204. Applies to common law fraudulent conveyance actions. 209 C. 437. Cited. 212 C. 509; 214 C. 464; 218 C. 512; 219 C. 363; 221 C. 384; 223 C. 436; 224 C. 483; 226 C. 652; 229 C. 256; 232 C. 527; 235 C. 559; 238 C. 800. Statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice case was tolled under newly adopted continuous representation doctrine. 263 C. 588. In the case of an action for malicious prosecution brought pursuant to 42 USC 1983, the appropriate limit is the 3-year limitations period applicable to tort actions. 286 C. 384. Section is an occurrence statute and its limitation period does not begin when plaintiff discovers an injury but rather the date when the conduct of defendant occurs. 289 C. 383. The existence of an original duty is not necessary to apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 301 C. 575. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, i.e. no time runs against the king, exempts state from operation of section. 307 C. 412. Statute of limitations for tort action and not breach of contract action applies to claims against defendant law firm where complaint contained no allegation that defendant breached specific contract provision and relied on language typically used in negligence cases. 311 C. 282.
Annotations to former statute limiting action for trespass or slander. In trespass for mesne profits, they will not be awarded for over 3 years. 2 R. 440. Action of trespass is not the appropriate one to recover for a fire communicated by a railway locomotive. 56 C. 24. In case of continuing trespass, recovery may be had for damages accruing for 3 years next preceding the action. 76 C. 316. History of section. 82 C. 581. Section applies where cause of action is founded on absolute liability from ultrahazardous activity of blasting. 137 C. 577. Cited. 139 C. 222; 142 C. 452. Such defense must be pleaded. 143 C. 31. The date of the act or omission complained of is the date when the negligent conduct of defendant occurs and is not the date when plaintiff first sustains damages. 144 C. 170.
Cited. 1 CA 123; Id., 550; Id., 652; 2 CA 322; 5 CA 473. The nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the relief demanded determines applicability of statute of limitations. 6 CA 187. Cited. 15 CA 458; Id., 677; 18 CA 525; 25 CA 360; 31 CA 235; Id., 750; 32 CA 384; Id., 786; 33 CA 422; Id., 842; Id., 702; 35 CA 31; 39 CA 183. Statute as applied to plaintiff not unconstitutional. Id., 289. Cited. 40 CA 449; 42 CA 712; 45 CA 554; 46 CA 199. In the case of special relation between attorney and client who were family, malpractice in deeds and escrow acts not barred by 3-year limitation since continuing course of conduct and special relationship. 65 CA 813. Court properly concluded that tolling claim was not barred by collateral estoppel doctrine where defendant was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the earlier cause of action; continuing course of conduct and continuous representation doctrines may apply in a legal malpractice action to toll statute of limitations. 69 CA 151. Applicable to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 78 CA 865. Does not apply to case where defendant negligently misidentified plaintiff's property as belonging to another, but rather such case concerns negligent injury to property and therefore statute of limitations in Sec. 52-584 applies. 79 CA 290. Pendency of a first action did not toll statute of limitations for a second action arising from the same wrong. 83 CA 442. Limitation period begins with date of the act or omission complained of, not date when plaintiff first discovers the injury. 85 CA 145. If a legal malpractice case is not ripe for adjudication until damage caused by the alleged malpractice becomes evident upon final judgment in the underlying action, the statute is tolled until such final judgment is rendered. 89 CA 690. Section applies to, and bars, defendant's fraudulent conveyance counterclaim since claim was filed more than 3 years after date of property transfer; section is an occurrence statute, meaning that the time period within which plaintiff must commence an action begins to run at moment the act or omission complained of occurs, not date when plaintiff first discovers the injury. 95 CA 436. Each distinct cause of action arising from the same wrong is governed by the statute of limitations appropriate to it and therefore plaintiff's second and third counts, which alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy, respectively, and are unquestionably tort actions, are governed by section. Id., 454. In a matter involving plaintiff investor who alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by defendant investment professionals, trial court properly refused to extend the continuous representation doctrine to all fiduciary relationships. 112 CA 441. For malicious prosecution claim, 3-year limitation period starts to toll from date criminal matter is dismissed, not date of arrest. 113 CA 131. For continuing course of conduct doctrine to apply to toll statute of limitations, a duty must have existed at time of original wrong and trial court improperly applied doctrine in context of an alleged duty arising simply because of the existence of a relationship between the parents of minor children. 115 CA 404; judgment reversed, see 301 C. 575. The 3-year period begins on date the act or omission complained of occurs, not date the cause of action accrues or date the injury occurs. 117 CA 129. Legal malpractice claim which sounds in tort is governed by the 3-year statute of limitations. 134 CA 785; judgment affirmed, see 311 C. 282. Statute of limitations is tolled where attorney, in legal malpractice action, breached continuing duty to his clients to apprise them of his negligence in drafting deed and to cure problems resulting from such negligence while the opportunity existed. 142 CA 97. In time barred situation involving legal malpractice claims, burden is on plaintiff to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine. 167 CA 691.
Cited. 4 CS 222; Id., 293; 8 CS 302. Application of statute of limitations is that of the forum and not where the cause of action arose. 12 CS 477. Sec. 22-357, making the owner or keeper of a dog liable for any damage to person or property done by the dog, is controlled by a 3-year statute of limitations for an action founded upon a tort. 14 CS 428; 26 CS 294, 296. Action for inducing entry into a mental institution by fraud falls within 3-year statute of limitations. 15 CS 434. Where action charges breach of contract for failure to procure insurance coverage against damage to plaintiff's property, cause of action is in tort but is not one for injury to property under Sec. 52-584. 17 CS 62. Cited. 17 CS 114; Id., 407; 18 CS 225; Id., 310. Cause of action based on nuisance when not arising from negligence based on 3-year statute of limitations. 20 CS 35. Cited. 22 CS 300. Controlling statute of limitations for parents sued under Sec. 52-572. 24 CS 320. Impleading under Sec. 52-102a barred by statute of limitations; claim against manufacturer for injuries caused by defective skates held tort liability, not breach of implied warranty under Sec. 42a-2-725 of Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore barred by statute of limitations. 27 CS 46. Statute of limitations for tort actions applies to personal injury action based on breach of warranty. 28 CS 160. Action for tort limited to 3-year statute of limitations. 29 CS 71. Cited. Id., 72. Mental incompetence does not toll the time limitation, but imprisonment may. 31 CS 46. Cited. 34 CS 22; Id., 643, 646. 3-year statute of limitations for tort actions applies to fraud or deception action. 36 CS 277. Cited. Id., 357; 39 CS 458; 44 CS 207; Id., 477; Id., 527. Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege fraudulent concealment to toll statute; defendant's assertion of statute of limitations in motion to strike rather than as a special defense was acceptable in this case; plaintiff failed to allege intent to conceal as is required to toll statute. 46 CS 386. Statutes of repose allow defendants at some point to be free from liability, absent unclean or fraudulent conduct, and logical conclusion is that legislature intended state to abide by statutes of repose. 51 CS 265.
Cause of action brought under Sec. 52-572 is governed by 3-year limitation imposed by this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 379.
Sec. 52-577a. Limitation of action based on product liability claim. (a) No product liability claim, as defined in section 52-572m, shall be brought but within three years from the date when the injury, death or property damage is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, except that, subject to the provisions of subsections (c), (d) and (e) of this section, no such action may be brought against any party nor may any party be impleaded pursuant to subsection (b) of this section later than ten years from the date that the party last parted with possession or control of the product.
(b) In any such action, a product seller may implead any third party who is or may be liable for all or part of the claimant's claim, if such third party defendant is served with the third party complaint within one year from the date the cause of action brought under subsection (a) of this section is returned to court.
(c) The ten-year limitation provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any product liability claim brought by a claimant who can prove that the harm occurred during the useful safe life of the product. In determining whether a product's useful safe life has expired, the trier of fact may consider among other factors: (1) The effect on the product of wear and tear or deterioration from natural causes; (2) the effect of climatic and other local conditions in which the product was used; (3) the policy of the user and similar users as to repairs, renewals and replacements; (4) representations, instructions and warnings made by the product seller about the useful safe life of the product; and (5) any modification or alteration of the product by a user or third party.
(d) The ten-year limitation provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be extended pursuant to the terms of any express written warranty that the product can be used for a period longer than ten years, and shall not preclude any action against a product seller who intentionally misrepresents a product or fraudulently conceals information about it, provided the misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment was the proximate cause of harm of the claimant.
(e) The ten-year limitation provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any product liability claim, whenever brought, involving injury, death or property damage caused by contact with or exposure to asbestos, except that (1) no such action for personal injury or death may be brought by the claimant later than eighty years from the date that the claimant last had contact with or exposure to asbestos, and (2) no such action for damage to property may be brought by the claimant later than thirty years from the date of last contact with or exposure to asbestos.
(f) The definitions contained in section 52-572m shall apply to this section.
(g) The provisions of this section shall apply to all product liability claims brought on or after October 1, 1979.
(P.A. 76-293, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-604, S. 36, 84; P.A. 79-483, S. 3; 79-631, S. 107, 111; P.A. 82-160, S. 247; P.A. 87-537, S. 12, 13; P.A. 90-191, S. 1; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 40, 70; P.A. 05-288, S. 180; P.A. 11-200, S. 1; P.A. 17-97, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 77-604 made slight change in wording of Subsec. (a); P.A. 79-483 restated existing provisions, changing deadline for bringing action from 8 to 10 years from date party against whom action is brought parted with possession or control of product and changing applicable date re pending claims or bringing of claims from June 4, 1976, to October 1, 1979, and inserted new provisions clarifying 10-year limitation designated as Subsecs. (c) and (d), relettering former Subsec. (c) as (e); P.A. 79-631 deleted reference to pending claims in Subsec. (e); P.A. 82-160 added a new Subsec. (e) concerning the applicability of definitions in Sec. 52-572m, redesignated the former Subsec. (e) as Subsec. (f) and made minor technical changes; P.A. 87-537 inserted new Subsec. (e) re exception to 10-year limitation on claims resulting from contact with or exposure to asbestos, relettering remaining Subsecs. accordingly and made technical changes; P.A. 90-191 amended Subsec. (e) to increase from 30 to 60 years the period of time after the claimant last had contact with or exposure to asbestos within which an action for personal injury or death may be brought, retaining a time limitation of 30 years for an action for damage to property; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 amended Subsec. (e) to reposition the words “for personal injury or death” from Subdiv. (2) to Subdiv. (1) to correct a typographical error; P.A. 05-288 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) to (e), effective July 13, 2005; P.A. 11-200 amended Subsec. (e)(1) to substitute “eighty years” for “sixty years” re last contact or exposure to asbestos, effective July 13, 2011, and applicable to any cause of action arising from any contact with or exposure to asbestos occurring prior to, on or after that date; P.A. 17-97 amended Subsec. (c) by deleting reference to claimant who is not entitled to compensation under Ch. 568 and making a conforming change.
When the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct, statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed. 180 C. 230. Cited. 187 C. 363; 191 C. 150. Court held act to be constitutional; not in violation of equal protection or open access to courts. 200 C. 562. Cited. 203 C. 156; 205 C. 219; 207 C. 496; Id., 599; 210 C. 189; 212 C. 462; Id., 509; 213 C. 282; 214 C. 464; 230 C. 335. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, i.e. no time runs against the king, exempts state from operation of section. 307 C. 412.
Cited. 16 CA 558; 31 CA 824; 46 CA 18; Id., 699. Under section, claimant is not time-barred until he knows, or should have known, the identity of the negligent person who caused his injury to occur. 75 CA 560.
Cited. 37 CS 735; 44 CS 510. Statutes of repose allow defendants at some point to be free from liability, absent unclean or fraudulent conduct, and logical conclusion is that legislature intended state to abide by statutes of repose. 51 CS 265.
Section held constitutional. 207 C. 599.
Statute of limitations began to run when damage was first discovered. 48 CA 160.
Requirement to serve third-party complaint within one year of case being returned to court is mandatory, not directory. 198 CA 24.
Statute of repose in section is procedural in nature, thus amendment by P.A. 17-97 is to be applied retroactively absent express language to the contrary. 333 C. 283.
Enumerated factors merely are guidelines to aid fact finder in determining whether a product is within its safe and useful life. 76 CA 137.
Sec. 52-577b. Limitation of action for damages caused by contact with or exposure to phenoxy herbicides. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-577 and 52-577a, an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by contact with or exposure to phenoxy herbicides while serving as a member of the armed forces of the United States in Indo-China from January 1, 1962, through March 29, 1973, may be commenced within two years from the date of discovery of such injury, or within two years from the date when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the cause of such injury should have been discovered, whichever is later.
Cited. 205 C. 219; 214 C. 464.
Sec. 52-577c. Limitation of action for damages caused by exposure to a hazardous chemical substance or mixture or hazardous pollutant. (a) For the purposes of this section: (1) “Environment” means any surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata or ambient air within the state or under the jurisdiction of the state; (2) “exposure” means any contact, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation, including irradiation; (3) “hazardous chemical substance or mixture” means petroleum, a petroleum product or any chemical substance or mixture for which there is a federal standard, including any law, requirement, tolerance, prohibition, action level or similar legal authority adopted by an agency pursuant to federal law, including any such standard or legal authority adopted by a state or local government pursuant to federal law, generally intended to prevent, reduce or mitigate the risk of a disease or class or type of diseases to an individual or individuals resulting from exposure to such chemical substance or mixture; (4) “hazardous pollutant” means any designated, specified or referenced chemical considered to be a “hazardous substance” under Section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 USC 9601(14); (5) “release” means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the environment.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-555, 52-577 and 52-577a, no action to recover damages for personal injury, death or property damage caused by exposure to a hazardous chemical substance or mixture or hazardous pollutant released into the environment shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury or damage complained of is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.
(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to an action brought against (1) any municipal waterworks system established and operated under chapter 102 or any special act, (2) any regional water authority established under any general statute or special act, or (3) any water company as defined in section 16-1.
(P.A. 84-287; P.A. 98-140, S. 6; P.A. 15-67, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 98-140 redefined “hazardous chemical substance or mixture” to include petroleum and petroleum products; P.A. 15-67 amended Subsec. (b) by adding “52-555” and substituting “personal injury, death or property damage” for “personal injury or property damage”, effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to all cases pending on and cases filed on or after that date.
Cited. 205 C. 219; 214 C. 464; 228 C. 905; 230 C. 12; 238 C. 800. Subsec. (b) does not preempt Sec. 52-555. 277 C. 337.
Cited. 31 CA 824.
Sec. 52-577d. Limitation of action for damages to person under twenty-one years of age caused by sexual abuse, exploitation or assault. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no action to recover damages for personal injury to a person under twenty-one years of age, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such person later than thirty years from the date such person attains the age of twenty-one.
(P.A. 86-401, S. 6, 7; 86-403, S. 104, 132; P.A. 91-240; P.A. 02-138, S. 2; P.A. 19-16, S. 13.)
History: P.A. 86-403 made technical change; P.A. 91-240 changed “two” years to “seventeen” years and deleted phrase “except that no such action may be brought more than 7 years from the date of the act complained of”; P.A. 02-138 extended the limitation on bringing an action from 17 to 30 years after the attainment of the age of majority, effective May 23, 2002, and applicable to any cause of action arising from an incident committed prior to, on or after said date; P.A. 19-16 replaced “minor” with “person under twenty-one years of age” and replaced “age of majority” with “age of twenty-one”, effective October 1, 2019, and applicable to any cause of action arising from an incident committed on or after October 1, 2019.
Cited. 214 C. 464. Court concluded that section as amended by expanding period of liability did not create a substantive change in the law that would preclude its retroactive application. 224 C. 483. Cited. 230 C. 472. Actions may be brought no later than 30 years from the date plaintiff personally attained the age of majority. 279 C. 207. Retroactive application of section to revive plaintiff's otherwise time barred claims does not violate defendant's substantive due process rights under Connecticut Constitution; defendant did not have a vested right to a defense under the lapsed statute of limitations. 317 C. 357. Section applicable to actions against the perpetrators of sexual abuse of minors as well as actions against parties whose negligent acts or omissions legally caused the personal injuries suffered by the victims of sexual abuse. 323 C. 303.
Cited. 39 CA 183. Whether plaintiff did or did not repress memories of the sexual abuse is irrelevant, as the section does not mention or require repressed memories, nor does it bar plaintiffs who have not repressed memories of the abuse from relying on it. 178 CA 547.
Cited. 44 CS 527; 45 CS 136.
Sec. 52-577e. Limitation of action for damages caused by sexual assault. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-577 and 52-577d, an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by sexual assault may be brought at any time after the date of the act complained of if the party legally at fault for such injury has been convicted of a violation of section 53a-70 or 53a-70a.
History: P.A. 02-138 effective May 23, 2002, and applicable to any cause of action arising from an incident committed prior to, on or after said date.
Sec. 52-577f. Limitation of action for damages caused by malicious prosecution. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no action to recover damages for malicious prosecution may be brought later than three years from the date of the termination of the criminal proceeding that is the subject of such action.
History: P.A. 21-104 effective July 1, 2021, and applicable to any cause of action arising from a criminal proceeding terminating prior to, on or after said date.
Secs. 52-577g to 52-577o. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 52-577p. Transferred to Chapter 925, Sec. 52-557p.
Sec. 52-578. Limitation of action for damages caused by change of grade of highway. No action shall be brought by the owner of land adjoining a public highway, or of any interest in such land, for recovery of special damage to such property or interest by reason of any change in the grade of such highway, or by reason of excavations in such highway made in the process of repairing the same by the town, city or borough in which such highway is situated, except within six years next after the right of action accrues.
(1949 Rev., S. 8317.)
Statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. 144 C. 170. Cited. 215 C. 464.
Sec. 52-579. Limitation of suit on probate bond; exception. No action shall be maintained against the surety on any probate bond unless brought within six years from the final settlement of account of the principal in such bond and the acceptance of such account by the Court of Probate; but this provision shall not apply to minors who are parties in interest.
(1949 Rev., S. 8318.)
Cited. 139 C. 220; 214 C. 464.
Sec. 52-580. Settlement of partnership or joint accounts. In any case of partnership or of joint occupancy of real or personal property, the court before which any action for the settlement or adjustment of the partnership or joint account is pending shall take into consideration, in making the settlement, all the partnership or joint transactions since the time of the last settlement, although more than six years may have elapsed since the last settlement.
(1949 Rev., S. 8319; P.A. 82-160, S. 248.)
History: P.A. 82-160 replaced “estate” with “property” and rephrased the section.
Same rule applies in actions of book debt; 1 D. 250; but not, ordinarily, in other cases. 9 C. 365.
Cited. 13 CS 175.
Sec. 52-581. Action on oral contract to be brought within three years. (a) No action founded upon any express contract or agreement which is not reduced to writing, or of which some note or memorandum is not made in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or his agent, shall be brought but within three years after the right of action accrues.
(b) This section shall not apply to causes of action governed by article 2 of title 42a.
(1949 Rev., S. 8320; 1961, P.A. 116, S. 24; P.A. 82-160, S. 249.)
History: 1961 act excepted causes of action governed by article 2 of title 42a; P.A. 82-160 deleted the exception for “actions for a debt due by book or actions founded on proper subjects of book debt”, rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.
Applies to actions to recover unliquidated damages for nonperformance of executory contracts. 52 C. 146. Cited. 56 C. 25. When applied to suit against surgeon for breach of implied contract to use reasonable care and skill. 103 C. 720; 119 C. 507; 127 C. 386; 134 C. 259. Applied to oral agreement to pay wages during incapacity and to reemploy in consideration of waiver of right to damages for injury. 114 C. 732; 134 C. 259. Does not apply to action by employee to recover overtime pay and liquidated damages under federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 134 C. 246. History of section. Id., 258. Distinguished from Sec. 52-576; this section is restricted to executory contracts. Id., 259. Proof of existence and performance of contract unenforceable because of statute of frauds is a sufficient answer to defense of statute of limitations by showing that no action brought earlier could be maintained. Id., 536. Since contract was executed and all that remained was to pay plaintiff, section does not bar action. 134 C. 585. Applies only to executory contracts. Id.; 135 C. 179. Statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. 144 C. 170. When plaintiff's performance on oral contract has been completely executed, Sec. 52-576 and not this section establishes applicable limitation period. 170 C. 243. Cited. 210 C. 734; 214 C. 464; 217 C. 340.
Cited. 17 CA 159; 18 CA 525; 33 CA 702; 39 CA 289. Section's 3-year statute of limitations applies only to executory contracts and, therefore, did not apply to executed oral contract; 6-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-576 applied. 76 CA 599. If a legal malpractice case is not ripe for adjudication until damage caused by alleged malpractice becomes evident upon final judgment in the underlying action, statute is tolled until such final judgment is rendered. 89 CA 690. Granting of motion for summary judgment in legal malpractice action on ground that action was commenced beyond the applicable statute of limitations was proper because statute of limitations began to run despite pendency of an appeal. 110 CA 679.
When statute begins to run. 3 CS 209. Applies to actions to recover unliquidated damages for nonperformance of executory contracts. 8 CS 264. Cited. 9 CS 401; Id., 522. History and scope discussed. 13 CS 174. Statute is tolled from incurrence of legal not apparent damage. 14 CS 464. Applies to suits based upon oral contract of employment under Fair Labor Standards Acts of 1938. 15 CS 3. Cited. 17 CS 61. Procedure required herein cannot be circumvented to avoid the 3-year limit set. 31 CS 434. Application restricted to executory contracts only, in contrast to application of Sec. 52-576 to contracts where party has fully performed. 37 CS 735. Cited. 39 CS 458.
Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 367.
Permits statutory requirement of a contract in writing to be satisfied by juxtaposition of two documents, each denoting the agreement of one of the parties, but not juxtaposition of two inconsistent documents; assumes existence of an underlying contractual commitment and addresses only the requirement of a written memorial thereof. 83 CA 715.
Sec. 52-582. Petition for new trial. (a) No petition for a new trial in any civil or criminal proceeding shall be brought but within three years next after the rendition of the judgment or decree complained of, except that a petition for a new trial in a criminal proceeding based on DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) evidence or other newly discovered evidence, as described in subsection (b) of this section, that was not discoverable or available at the time of the original trial or at the time of any previous petition under this section, may be brought at any time after the discovery or availability of such new evidence, and the court may grant the petition if the court finds that had such evidence been presented at trial, there is a reasonable likelihood there would have been a different outcome at the trial.
(b) (1) Such newly discovered evidence in support of a petition for a new trial may include newly discovered forensic scientific evidence that was not discoverable or available at the time of the original trial or original or previous petition for a new trial, as determined by the court under subdivision (2) of this subsection, including that which might undermine any forensic scientific evidence presented at the original trial.
(2) The court shall consider whether relevant forensic scientific evidence was not discoverable or available at the time of the original trial based upon a consideration of whether the relevant scientific evidence has changed since the applicable trial date or dates, or date of entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or the date of the most recent petition under this section.
(c) No provision of this section shall be construed to create a civil or criminal liability for an expert witness who repudiates the forensic scientific evidence such witness provided at a previous hearing or trial or included in a previous petition or who offered such evidence that has since been undermined by later scientific research or technological advancements.
(d) For purposes of this section, “forensic” means the application of scientific or technical practices to the recognition, collection, analysis and interpretation of evidence for criminal and civil law or regulatory issues, “forensic scientific evidence” includes scientific knowledge or technical knowledge, reports or testimony by forensic analysts or experts, and scientific standards or a scientific method or technique upon which the relevant scientific evidence is based, and “scientific knowledge” includes knowledge of the general scientific community and all fields of scientific knowledge upon which those fields or disciplines rely.
(1949 Rev., S. 8322; P.A. 00-80, S. 2, 3; P.A. 18-61, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 00-80 added exception authorizing a petition based on DNA evidence not discoverable or available at time of original trial to be brought at any time after the discovery or availability of the new evidence, effective May 16, 2000, and applicable to any offense committed prior to, on or after that date; P.A. 18-61 designated existing provisions re petition for new trial as Subsec. (a) and amended same by adding provisions re exceptions allowing petition for new trial to be brought, added Subsec. (b) re newly discovered evidence in support of petition for new trial, added Subsec. (c) re civil or criminal liability, and added Subsec. (d) defining “forensic”, “forensic scientific evidence” and “scientific knowledge”.
The “rendition” is the time when judgment was actually entered. 1 R. 54. Complaint for equitable relief from judgment obtained without notice should be seasonably brought. 46 C. 605. Petition for new trial may be brought under this section despite Sec. 52-212, though judgment was by default. 93 C. 160; 97 C. 123. Cited. 138 C. 573; 140 C. 464. Effect of 3-year limitation not decided. 142 C. 20. “Rendition of judgment” is judgment at the trial court where it is sustained on appeal. 181 C. 58. Cited. 214 C. 464; 229 C. 397; 230 C. 427.
Cited. 3 CA 322; 24 CA 152; 25 CA 155; 27 CA 621. Statute of limitations was not tolled by respondent's alleged fraudulent concealment of evidence because petitioner failed to present evidence that respondent had fraudulently concealed evidence. 111 CA 656. Section's mandatory language and lack of a good cause exception indicate the legislature intended the three year limitations period set forth in the section to be a jurisdictional bar; petitioner's failure to comply with the time limitation deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition for a new trial or to apply any equitable tolling doctrine to extend the limitations period. 172 CA 352.
Must be determined solely upon its own issues and without regard to questions raised by appeal from judgment. 20 CS 469. Imposition of sentence is final judgment in criminal cases and stay of execution does not affect time limit for bringing appeal. 36 CS 53. Cited. 37 CS 891; 38 CS 534.
Motion for new trial not equivalent to petition for new trial. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 388.
Sec. 52-583. Limitation of action against sheriff, state marshal or constable for neglect or default. No civil action shall be brought against any sheriff, state marshal or constable, for any neglect or default in his or her office or duty, but within two years next after the right of action accrues.
(1949 Rev., S. 8323; P.A. 10-178, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 10-178 replaced “sheriff's deputy” with “state marshal” and made a technical change.
When right of action accrues. 26 C. 334. Assumpsit for money collected on execution, not within statute. 1 R. 303. Action against sheriff for default of deputy; deputy's suit on receipt held to constitute acknowledgment of continuing liability which prevented the running of statute. 38 C. 195. Action against officer for neglecting to make demand of garnishee, accrues at the expiration of the 60 days allowed for that purpose. 50 C. 526. Statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. 144 C. 170. Cited. 214 C. 464.
Limited suits on former Sec. 18-49 as to time of commencement. 7 CS 328.
Sec. 52-584. Limitation of action for injury to person or property caused by negligence, misconduct or malpractice. No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, advanced practice registered nurse, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.
(1949 Rev., S. 8324; 1957, P.A. 467; 1969, P.A. 401, S. 2; P.A. 19-98, S. 26.)
History: 1969 act changed deadline for bringing action from one year to two years from date injury is first sustained or discovered or should have been discovered, effective October 1, 1969, and applicable to injuries first sustained on or after that date; P.A. 19-98 added reference to advanced practice registered nurse.
See Sec. 52-190a re automatic ninety-day extension to allow reasonable inquiry in malpractice action.
See Sec. 52-555 re actions for injuries resulting in death.
See Sec. 52-594 re time limits for executor or administrator to bring personal action which survives to representatives of a deceased person.
Cited. 34 C. 58. In case of death, failure to appoint administrator will not stop statute running. 77 C. 110. Includes all corporations. Id., 529. Demurrer cannot raise question of statute, as date of injury is immaterial. 81 C. 284; 82 C. 579; 83 C. 503. “Injury” means hurt; statute applies to action by husband for negligent injury to wife. 83 C. 505. Action for damage to goods from fall of leased building held to be in section. 82 C. 578. Negligence of telegraph company in changing order for goods not within section. 91 C. 35. Applied to action against surgeon for negligence in treatment; but not against him in contract. 103 C. 719, but see 119 C. 507. Cited. 114 C. 732. Applies to actions against nonresidents begun under Sec. 52-62. 116 C. 648. History of section. 119 C. 502. Applies to all actions to recover for personal injuries whether due to negligence or not. Id., 507. Cited. 123 C. 648. In malpractice action, statute runs from act if injury was then complete, from termination of treatment if injury arises from a course of treatment. 127 C. 385. Cited. 128 C. 108. Statute held applicable to action here under N.J. workmen's compensation law, although right of action thereunder did not arise until after expiration of the 1-year period. 131 C. 665. Ignorance that damage has been done does not prevent running of statute, except where there is something tantamount to fraudulent concealment of cause of action. 135 C. 176. Does not apply to cause of action founded on absolute liability from ultrahazardous activity of blasting. 137 C. 577. Cannot be construed as embodying an exception by implication in favor of an unemancipated minor. 139 C. 218. Action for injury to the person is governed by 1-year statute of limitations only if the injury is caused by negligence, by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice. 142 C. 452. Enactment of a statute which may bar an action even before the cause of action accrues is not beyond the power of the legislature and is consonant with the purpose of a statute of limitations which is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which the persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution; the 1-year period of limitation starts to run at the date when defendant negligently does the act which results in damages to plaintiff. 144 C. 170. Cited. Id., 282. When the act or omission complained of was not merely selling a defective cartridge but permitting it to be available for future use without indicating its potential danger, such claim was not an act or omission completed at the time of the sale but of conduct continuing to the time of the injury. Id., 316. Cited. 148 C. 327. Running of statute of limitations suspended between decedent's death and appointment of administrator in personal injury action against estate. 153 C. 255. Cited. 154 C. 708. Does not apply to action by riparian owners against water company for diversion of waters. 155 C. 477. Defense of statute of limitations is not proper matter for plea to jurisdiction. 159 C. 416. Cited. 168 C. 329. Action based on negligence must, by section, be brought within 1 year of injury complained of but in any event within 3 years “of the act or omission complained of”. 170 C. 289. Cited. 185 C. 390; 186 C. 632; 188 C. 301; 190 C. 8; 192 C. 327; Id., 451; Id., 497; Id., 732; 198 C. 660; 199 C. 683; 200 C. 562; 201 C. 39. Lack of informed consent is malpractice under statute. 205 C. 1. Cited. Id., 255; Id., 741; 206. C. 229; 207 C. 204; Id., 496; Id., 599; 209 C. 437; 211 C. 199; 212 C. 509. Application of 3-year bar with respect to negligence occurring prior to that period does not infringe upon Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Connecticut Constitution. 213 C. 282. Cited. 214 C. 242; Id., 464; 215 C. 377; 216 C. 412; 218 C. 531; 219 C. 363; 225 C. 238. “Continuous treatment” and “continuing course of conduct” doctrines discussed. 229 C. 256. Cited. 232 C. 527; 237 C. 25; 238 C. 800; 239 C. 265; 242 C. 1. Statute of limitations was tolled; judgment of Appellate Court in 42 CA 324 reversed. Id., 236. Statute of limitations was tolled when employer received notice of an employee's timely filed action against a third party tortfeasor and intervened within 30-day period prescribed by Sec. 31-293. 246 C. 156. Where improvements to real property contemplated by architect's or engineer's services are not completed because of defect complained of, Sec. 52-584a, and not this section, applies to plaintiff's cause of action. 247 C. 293. Mental suffering constitutes injury, even if unaccompanied by physical trauma to the body. 248 C. 21. Precondition of continuing course of conduct doctrine is that defendant must have committed an initial wrong upon plaintiff. 252 C. 193. Since there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the 3-year repose section contained in statute was tolled by defendant's alleged ongoing failure to warn plaintiff of his concern for cancer thus triggering the continuing course of conduct doctrine, it was improper for trial court to have concluded that there was no continuing course of conduct as a matter of law and to have granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id., 363. Allegations in amended complaint presented a new and different set of facts and were barred by statute of limitations since new facts did not relate back to original complaint. 257 C. 58. Does not impose a duty on plaintiff to investigate, instead, it requires jury to consider all the facts and circumstances in order to determine date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered; does not impose a heightened standard of discovery on health care professionals regarding discovery of actionable harm. 262 C. 797. Correct legal standard by which to evaluate timeliness of causes of action in negligence restated; limitation period for actions in negligence begins to run on date when injury is first discovered or in exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered. 268 C. 723. 90-day extension provided in Sec. 52-190a(b) applies equally to both the 2-year statute of limitation and 3-year statute of repose in this section. 269 C. 787. Legislature's purpose in distinguishing “injury or actionable harm” from “the act or omission complained of” and providing a 3-year statute of repose, was to avoid “draconian effect” of running the 2-year limitation period from the date of defendant's negligence in cases in which plaintiff is unable to bring an action because he could not discover an essential jurisdictional fact, despite the exercise of reasonable care; 2-year statute of limitations set forth in statute does not begin to run until plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known the identity of the tortfeasor; plaintiff's ignorance of tortfeasor's identity will not excuse plaintiff's failure to bring a negligence action within 3 years of the date of the act or omission complained of. 271 C. 284. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that two isolated contacts with two different radiologists at same hospital over the course of 3 years constituted a continuing course of conduct or treatment so as to toll the statute of limitations set forth in section for the purpose of allowing plaintiff to pursue a medical malpractice claim against the hospital for failing to discover her brain tumor. 279 C. 312. Plaintiff parents' claims against gynecologist delivering their infant were barred by the 3-year repose provision in statute; there was no genuine issue of material fact that gynecologist was not under a continuing duty to warn plaintiff parents of potential complications associated with respiratory distress syndrome because gynecologist ceased to be infant's treating physician after his birth; responsibility for infant's care and treatment after his birth was assumed by another physician who diagnosed infant as having the syndrome, and any legal duty that gynecologist had re infant prior to delivery concluded upon date of his birth; imposition on delivering hospital of a continuing duty to inform plaintiff parents of all potential complications associated with infant's diagnosis regardless of his treating physician's actual knowledge would nullify the 3-year repose provision established by legislature for medical malpractice actions; continuing course of conduct doctrine did not toll such repose provision. 280 C. 190. Continuous treatment doctrine did not apply to bar statute of limitations. 282 C. 745. Action was not time barred because there were disputed facts sufficient to warrant the invocation of continuing course of conduct doctrine. 287 C. 158. Evidence that defendant should have been aware or that defendant deviated from the standard of care does not amount to actual knowledge to impose a continuing duty on defendant so that the period of repose is tolled under continuous course of conduct doctrine; evidence must be submitted to prove the existence of a physician-patient relationship or ongoing course of treatment by defendant in order to properly toll the period of repose under continuing treatment doctrine. 290 C. 347. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, i.e. no time runs against the king, exempts state from operation of section. 307 C. 412. Routine postoperative appointments for the purposes of tracking the progress of plaintiff's condition and postoperative complications, if any, constitute continuing course of treatment for any identified medical condition that was caused by the surgery. 321 C. 637. The relation back doctrine applies to a proposed new or changed allegation of negligence when it falls within the scope of the original cause of action, which is the transaction or occurrence underpinning plaintiff's legal claim against defendant. 325 C. 198. The plaintiff's knowledge of the causal connection between the defendants' alleged negligence and her physical harm is a material fact because it begins the accrual of statute of limitation; legislative history supports conclusion that “injury” as used in statute was intended to mean a legally recognized injury, not just physical hurt or loss. 342 C. 103.
Cited. 1 CA 7; Id., 123; Id., 652. Provides no exceptions for minors or insane persons. 3 CA 602. Cited. 6 CA 212; 11 CA 156; 14 CA 178; 16 CA 108; 18 CA 515; 19 CA 16; 21 CA 524; 22 CA 610; 24 CA 239; 25 CA 665; 29 CA 392; 31 CA 235; Id., 569; 32 CA 187; Id., 205; 33 CA 6; Id., 378; Id., 422; Id., 673; 34 CA 395; 38 CA 458; Id., 829; 42 CA 324; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 236; 43 CA 397; 45 CA 775; 46 CA 712. Continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply after plaintiff discovers the harm. 59 CA 311. Service of prejudgment remedy document did not toll the running of section, even though contained the words “the institution of this action” and included unsigned proposed writ of summons and complaint, since unsigned writ and complaint does not have effect of commencing a civil action; court declined to adopt rule that section is tolled when prejudgment remedy documents are served. 61 CA 234. Where plaintiff's suit against a state officer was dismissed due to immunity, the 2-year statute of limitations applies in subsequent suit against the state and the exception under Sec. 52-593 for failure to name the right person as defendant does not apply. 62 CA 545. Statute of limitations not tolled by continuous course of conduct doctrine where pathology group failed to diagnose plaintiff's disease, because to expect pathology group to provide follow-up treatment or to instruct patient on follow-up care after a negative diagnosis when there is no awareness that the diagnosis is wrong and there is no ongoing relationship is beyond the expectation of public policy. 66 CA 518. Because plaintiff failed to offer any evidence to demonstrate that defendant physician had an awareness of risk to plaintiff subsequent to the surgical sterilization procedure, plaintiff could not establish that defendant had a continuing duty to warn her so as to toll the limitation period of statute. 67 CA 565. Although genuine issue of material fact existed re defendant's initial alleged negligence, trial court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to prove that defendant physician was aware of a risk to plaintiff that would have triggered a continuing duty to warn her so as to toll the limitation period of statute. Id., 576. Statutes of limitation are not tolled by an automatic bankruptcy stay; pursuant to federal law, if the statute of limitations expires during the automatic bankruptcy stay, plaintiff has 30 days from notice of termination or expiration of the stay within which to commence an action. 68 CA 79. Where defendant negligently misidentified plaintiff's property as belonging to another, the case concerns negligent injury to property and therefore statute of limitations in section applies rather than the 3-year limitation set forth in Sec. 52-577. 79 CA 290. Doctrines of continuous treatment and continuing course of conduct apply, as a matter of law, only to 3-year limitation period and do not apply to toll time period for discovery portion of statute. 82 CA 396. Claim cast in contractual language subject to 3-year period of statute because, in light of noneconomic relief sought, it more closely resembles claim based on tortious conduct arising out of negligent performance or nonperformance of contractual duty than claim for breach of contract. 84 CA 1. Sheriff's attempt to serve defendant with process before he fled and subsequent service in defendant's mailbox were sufficient to constitute good faith efforts at compliance when defendant was clearly evading service. 93 CA 76. Once plaintiff became aware of her injuries on date of fall, statute of limitations began to run and, because the statute was not tolled, plaintiff was required to bring action within 2 years from date of discovery. 141 CA 282. Statute of limitations not tolled by common-law holiday rule for service of process to state marshals, as they are independent contractors and not state employees subject to mandatory closure on state holidays. 153 CA 563. “Foreign object exception” to statute of repose not recognized in Connecticut; statute of repose does not violate open courts provision of Connecticut Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10. 154 CA 1. When the original complaint alleges negligence, an amended complaint relating back to the original complaint and specifying the manner in which defendant was allegedly negligent is not considered a new theory of negligence for the purposes of section. 158 CA 66; judgment affirmed, see 325 C. 198.
Cited. 1 CS 142. Includes personal injuries whether or not due to negligence, citing 119 C. 500, 507. 3 CS 417. Injury means physical injury. 4 CS 293. Action for malpractice whether founded on tort or contract must be brought within one year. 6 CS 92, but see 11 CS 180. Cited. 8 CS 93; 9 CS 312. Cause of action otherwise barred by statute of limitations is not saved because it is asserted as a counterclaim. Id., 387. Cited. 10 CS 6. Statute should not be passed upon by demurrer unless matters in avoidance of it have been voluntarily inserted in the complaint. Id., 419; 17 CS 1. Cited. 11 CS 119. Section carves out an action ex contractu resulting from tortious or negligent conduct which caused a breach of contract. 12 CS 286. Withholding service for the purpose of allowing insurance company to adjust claim will not estop statute from tolling if insurance company is not a party defendant. 14 CS 418. Legal damage and apparent damage distinguished. Id., 464. Action for inducing entry into a mental institution is not limited by this section but by Sec. 52-577. 15 CS 434. Cited. 17 CS 62. Where amendment to complaint made more than 2 years after accident was based on nuisance, it was not barred since it is a question of fact whether nuisance resulted from positive act or negligence. Id., 114; 20 CS 36. Cited. 18 CS 225. Section controls limitation on action for damage to plaintiff's fence caused by the crumpling of a stone ledge on defendant's property near the common boundary. Id., 308. Under former statute, claimed negligence against manufacturer from expulsion of automobile tire while being mounted on rim held barred by statute because manufacture took place more than a year before action was begun; former statute compared. 19 CS 293. Defendant employer and its insurer not required to intervene within the 1-year period. 20 CS 31. Former statute compared. Id., 34. When wrong sued upon consists of continuing course of conduct, statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed. 22 CS 46. Statute of limitations bars plaintiff from amending his complaint in a personal injury action to add a claim for property damage more than 1 year after the collision. Id., 472. Where the action is seasonably brought so far as section is concerned, the legislature did not intend that section qualify the right of the employee under Sec. 31-293 to join as a plaintiff within 30 days thereafter. 23 CS 106. Counterclaim more than a year after the occurrence is barred unless it may be allowed under exception; held that pleadings had been finally closed on the filing of a reply when they terminated in an issue of fact decisive of the merits of the case; that the court might reopen the pleadings at any time to permit amendment did not mean that they were not closed within the intendment of statute. Id., 139. Cited. Id., 367; 24 CS 321. Where complaint is broad enough to permit proof of causes in tort and contract, demurrer merely reaching tort action is insufficient. Id., 459. Where plaintiffs alleged only negligence in their complaint, their motion to amend by charging defendant with wanton misconduct stated a new cause of action and could not be granted since statute of limitations had run. 25 CS 363. Section does not apply to the “Dog Injury” statute, which is governed by Sec. 52-577. 26 CS 294. Impleading under Sec. 52-102a barred by statute of limitations. 27 CS 46. Motion to amend complaint to expand or amplify original allegations does not change cause of action and is not barred by statute of limitations. Id., 60. Cited. 28 CS 162. Where 1 year period with respect to antemortem injuries had not expired when decedent died, his personal representative under Sec. 52-594 had year from date of death to institute action. Id., 461. Ordinarily, statute of limitations does not commence to run against defendant (third-party plaintiff) and in favor of third-party defendant until judgment has been entered against defendant. 29 CS 9. Statute of limitation suspended between decedent's death and appointment of administrator in personal injury action against estate. Id., 246. Time does not begin to run in a case involving a failure to warn of a foreign object in a patient's body until the object is discovered, unless reasonable diligence would have uncovered it earlier. 32 CS 118. Cited. 34 CS 22. Provisions of section should not be extended to allow codefendant to interpose cross claim when statute of limitations has run on plaintiff's cause of action. Id., 247. Statute of limitation is tolled upon the death of a tortfeasor until a fiduciary of his estate is properly appointed and qualified. 36 CS 121. Cited. Id., 269; 37 CS 735; Id., 899; 38 CS 318; 40 CS 266; 42 CS 187; 44 CS 148; Id., 527; 45 CS 136. Continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply to the 2-year limitation; term “injury” in statute requires an actionable harm. Id., 154. Plaintiff's claim fails to toll statute; defendant's assertion of statute of limitations in motion to strike rather than as a special defense was acceptable in this case. 46 CS 386. Plaintiffs' allegations of negligence, occurring 21 years before filing of suit, made against named defendant for failure to have valid certificate of occupancy or to design, construct, operate or properly maintain property in accordance with building and fire codes, were not barred as untimely by tort statute of limitations so as to warrant granting of defendants' motion to strike those counts so alleging; facts demonstrated continuous course of conduct that tolled time limitations of section. 50 CS 28. Statutes of repose allow defendants at some point to be free from liability, absent unclean or fraudulent conduct, and logical conclusion is that legislature intended state to abide by statutes of repose. 51 CS 265.
Action based on claim physician broke contract to achieve certain result from operation is not malpractice action; malpractice defined. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 135. Cause of action brought under Sec. 52-572 not governed by 1-year limitation imposed by this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 379. Defendant may be estopped by his agreement, conduct, representations or fraud from asserting the bar of statute, provided plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence upon which the judge can base such a finding. Id., 686, 689. In a small claims action, according to the Practice Book, Secs. 900, 901, statute of limitation stops running when the case is entered in court even though the service of notice is not made within the statutory period. Id., 690, 697. Where pleadings showed plaintiffs knew at date of accident they had substantial injuries, they had not met burden of demonstrating an exception to usual running of statute and defendant's motion for summary judgment was correctly granted. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 85. Defendant insurer's discussions of settlement did not estop it from pleading statute as defense to plaintiff's action where there was no fraud on its part and final offer had been made 4 months before statute barred action. Id., 127. When defendant accepted plaintiff's offer of settlement of her cause of action for personal injuries, statute became inoperative as defense as contract had been made between the parties. Id., 274. Cited. Id., 488.
Sec. 52-584a. Limitation of action against architect, professional engineer or land surveyor. (a) No action or arbitration, whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise, (1) to recover damages (A) for any deficiency in the design, planning, contract administration, supervision, observation of construction or construction of, or land surveying in connection with, an improvement to real property; (B) for injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficiency; (C) for injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such deficiency, or (2) for contribution or indemnity which is brought as a result of any such claim for damages shall be brought against any architect, professional engineer or land surveyor performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, observation of construction or construction of, or land surveying in connection with, such improvement more than seven years after substantial completion of such improvement.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, in the case of such an injury to property or the person or such an injury causing wrongful death, which injury occurred during the seventh year after such substantial completion, an action in tort to recover damages for such an injury or wrongful death may be brought within one year after the date on which such injury occurred, irrespective of the date of death, but in no event may such an action be brought more than eight years after the substantial completion of construction of such an improvement.
(c) For purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, an improvement to real property shall be considered substantially complete when (1) it is first used by the owner or tenant thereof or (2) it is first available for use after having been completed in accordance with the contract or agreement covering the improvement, including any agreed changes to the contract or agreement, whichever occurs first.
(d) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of defense by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of such an improvement at the time any deficiency in such an improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to bring action.
(1969, P.A. 513, S. 1–5; 1972, P.A. 294, S. 36; P.A. 86-266, S. 2; P.A. 88-364, S. 70, 123; P.A. 98-137, S. 61, 62; 98-219, S. 33, 34.)
History: 1972 act removed actions and arbitrations brought against architectural designers from purview of section; P.A. 86-266 deleted former Subsec. (d), thereby expanding the applicability of the seven-year statute of limitations for actions against architects and engineers, relettering former Subsec. (e) accordingly; P.A. 88-364 made technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 98-137 made provisions applicable to actions and arbitrations against land surveyors for any deficiency in land surveying in connection with an improvement to property, effective October 1, 1998, and applicable to any action or arbitration brought on or after said date with respect to a land survey performed or furnished on or after said date; P.A. 98-219 revised effective date of P.A. 98-137, but without affecting this section.
Cited. 205 C. 219; Id., 741. Held constitutional. 207 C. 496. Cited. 214 C. 464. Where improvements to real property contemplated by architect's or engineer's services are not completed because of defect complained of, this section, and not Sec. 52-584, applies to plaintiff's cause of action. 247 C. 293. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, i.e. no time runs against the king, exempts state from operation of section; Commissioner of Public Works had no authority to contractually waive repose period and such provision is unenforceable. 307 C. 412.
Statute intended to create a 7-year absolute maximum on actions against architects and engineers while leaving any other lesser limitations in place. 6 CA 212. Cited. 24 CA 81; 45 CA 775. Where forum was at issue, court properly declined to hear matter concerning statute of limitations re contract when it could not determine with positive assurance that issues of timeliness were intended by the parties to be excluded from the contract's arbitration clause. 62 CA 483. Section applies even though no physical alteration of real property is required or effected, and the seven year limitation period for bringing an action began to run when the alleged negligent design was completed. 181 CA 356.
Cited. 34 CS 22. Statutes of repose allow defendants at some point to be free from liability, absent unclean or fraudulent conduct, and logical conclusion is that legislature intended state to abide by statutes of repose. 51 CS 265.
Statute not applicable to surveyors who performed or finished surveys before October 1, 1998. 72 CA 236.
Sec. 52-584b. Limitation of actions against attorneys in connection with title certificates or opinions and title searches. Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, no action, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, against an attorney to recover for injury caused by negligence or by reckless or wanton misconduct in the preparation of and the execution and delivery of an attorney's title certificate or opinion, or the title search in connection therewith, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, except that no such action may be brought more than ten years from the date of such delivery. A counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.
Cited. 214 C. 464.
Letter seeking approval to partition real property found not to be a title certificate or opinion within meaning of statute. 56 CA 363.
Sec. 52-584c. Limitation of actions brought by the state or political subdivision of the state arising out of construction-related work. (a) As used in this section: (1) “Construction-related work” means the design, construction, construction management, planning, construction administration, surveying, supervision, inspection or observation of construction of improvements to real property; and (2) “tolling agreement” means a written agreement between the state or a political subdivision of the state and (A) a person performing or furnishing construction-related work, (B) a surety, or (C) an insurer, by which the person, surety or insurer agrees to extend the limitation period within which the state or a political subdivision may bring an action or claim against such person, surety or insurer.
(b) For any improvement to real property substantially completed on or after October 1, 2017, and subject to any statutory or common law rules tolling limitations periods, no action or claim, whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise, to recover damages for any deficiency arising out of construction-related work, or for any injury to property, real or personal, or for any injury to the person, or bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of any such deficiency, shall be brought by the state or any political subdivision of the state more than ten years after the date of substantial completion of such improvement.
(c) No action or claim described in subsection (b) of this section for an improvement to real property substantially completed prior to October 1, 2017, shall be brought by the state or any political subdivision of the state after October 1, 2027.
(d) For any improvement to real property substantially completed on or after October 1, 2017, and subject to any statutory or common law rules tolling limitations periods, an action or claim for indemnity or contribution arising out of construction-related work shall be brought by the state or any political subdivision of the state not more than ten years after the date of substantial completion of such improvement or not later than three years after the date of the determination of the action or claim against the state or political subdivision of the state that is seeking indemnification by either judgment or settlement, whichever occurs later. For any improvement to real property substantially completed prior to October 1, 2017, and subject to any statutory or common law rules tolling limitations periods, an action or claim for indemnity or contribution arising out of construction-related work shall be brought by the state or any political subdivision of the state not later than October 1, 2027, or not later than three years after the date of the determination of the action or claim against the state or political subdivision of the state that is seeking indemnification by either judgment or settlement, whichever occurs later.
(e) The limitations prescribed in subsections (b) to (d), inclusive, of this subsection shall not bar an action or claim (1) on a written warranty, guarantee or other agreement, including a tolling agreement, that expressly provides for a longer effective period; (2) based on wilful misconduct in connection with the performance or furnishing of construction-related work; (3) under any environmental remediation law or pursuant to any contract entered into by the state or any political subdivision of the state in carrying out its responsibilities under any environmental remediation law; or (4) pursuant to any contract for enclosure, removal or encapsulation of asbestos.
(f) For the purposes of subsections (b) to (d), inclusive, of this section, an improvement to real property shall be considered substantially complete when such real property is first (1) used by the state or any political subdivision of the state, or a tenant thereof; or (2) available for use after having been completed in accordance with the contract or agreement covering the improvement, including any agreed changes to the contract or agreement, whichever occurs first, except that any public highway, bridge improvement or improvement to railroad right-of-way, ferry, port or airport infrastructure shall be considered substantially complete upon the issuance of a certificate of acceptance of the work relieving the contractor of maintenance responsibility.
(g) Except as provided in this section, there shall be no limitation to actions brought in the name or for the benefit of the state, and no claim of right predicated upon the lapse of time shall be asserted against the state.
History: P.A. 15-28 effective October 1, 2017.
Sec. 52-585. Suit for forfeiture on penal statute limited to one year. No suit for any forfeiture upon any penal statute shall be brought but within one year next after the commission of the offense. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any civil action brought by the state or a municipality, or any officer or agent thereof, to recover a forfeiture or civil penalty.
(1949 Rev., S. 8325; P.A. 91-312, S. 44.)
History: P.A. 91-312 added provision re nonapplicability to any civil action brought by the state or a municipality to recover a forfeiture or civil penalty.
Amendment of declaration will not be allowed after the year. 4 D. 37. Cited. 56 C. 23; 57 C. 54, 55. A bylaw prohibiting any excavation in the highway held a penal statute. 64 C. 429. Statute giving additional compensation for cutting trees on another's land not penal. 74 C. 134. Where statute gives forfeiture for each month's delay, no recovery can be had except for year preceding action. 76 C. 559. Does not apply to action for liquidated damages for which employer is liable under federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 134 C. 257. Cited. 214 C. 464.
Sec. 52-586. Scire facias against garnishee limited to one year. No writ of scire facias against any garnishee shall be brought but within one year next after the right of bringing it accrues.
(1949 Rev., S. 8326.)
Demand on execution within 60 days is prerequisite to right to bring scire facias; statute runs from time of demand. 97 C. 398; 104 C. 280; 105 C. 427. Cited. 214 C. 464.
Sec. 52-587. Suit on bond or recognizance for costs limited to one year. No action shall be brought against the surety on any bond or recognizance for costs only, given in any civil action, or on the appeal of any civil cause, or on any bail bond, except within one year after final judgment has been rendered in the suit in which such bond or recognizance was given.
(1949 Rev., S. 8327.)
It is no excuse that a petition for a new trial was pending during the whole of the year. 1 R. 249. A bond, in a bastardy suit, may be sued within a year after the time for the last quarterly payment. K. 268. Judgment regarded as rendered at the date of withdrawal, and not at the time of taxing costs. 48 C. 305. Claim against deceased surety, on bond for costs, may be presented at any time within the probate limitation. Id., 384. Cited. 214 C. 464.
Sec. 52-588. Suit on note obtained by fraud. No action shall be brought on a negotiable note, if the holder thereof has been notified in writing by the maker thereof, or his attorney or agent, that such note was obtained of the maker in pursuance of a conspiracy, or of a general intent to defraud, unless the same is brought within one year after such notice was given, or six months after such note became due; nor shall any claim on such note be maintained against the estate of any deceased person or insolvent debtor, unless such claim is presented within the time above specified after notice as aforesaid. If any such note is negotiated after it is due, the provisions of this section shall be held to apply to any action or proceeding founded upon such note in as full a manner as if the plaintiff had been the holder of such note at the time when such notice was given.
(1949 Rev., S. 8328.)
Cited. 189 C. 401; 214 C. 464; 233 C. 304.
Sec. 52-589. Action of forcible entry and detainer limited to six months. No complaint for a forcible entry and detainer shall be brought but within six months after the entry complained of.
(1949 Rev., S. 8329.)
Cited. 214 C. 464.
Action in entry and detainer was time barred as a matter of law because it did not fall within the 6-month statute of limitations set forth in statute. 71 CA 859.
Sec. 52-590. When defendant's absence from state to be excluded. In computing the time limited in the period of limitation prescribed under any provision of chapter 925 or this chapter, the time during which the party, against whom there may be any such cause of action, is without this state shall be excluded from the computation, except that the time so excluded shall not exceed seven years.
(1949 Rev., S. 8330; 1959, P.A. 429; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 87; P.A. 85-548, S. 4.)
History: 1959 act clarified language, specifying section applies to periods prescribed under chapter 925 or this chapter and limited time excluded to seven years; 1963 act included periods prescribed in section 52-435a; P.A. 85-548 deleted reference to Sec. 46b-160.
This applies, although both parties are and always have been nonresidents. 24 C. 442. A temporary absence is not within statute. 16 C. 113, 116; 105 C. 569. Ownership of attachable property in Connecticut does not give nonresident debtor the right to invoke the aid of our statute of limitation. 55 C. 577. One who occupied apartment in New York with his wife a considerable portion of the time held to be still a resident here. 92 C. 55. Periods during which defendant is within the state may be added together to form statutory period; domicile in another state does not prevent one from having a usual place of abode here; defendant may have two or more usual places of abode in two or more states; time excluded while out of the state covers only absences which prevent service of process in actions in personam. 105 C. 571. Statute runs against nonresident when he acquires a usual place of abode here; against a resident when he returns here. Id., 568. Not applicable to actions against nonresidents begun under Sec. 52-62. 116 C. 643. Cited. 131 C. 675; 225 C. 238.
Cited. 31 CA 569.
When “usual place of abode” is acquired. 7 CS 145. Cited. 17 CS 222; Id., 408. Statute of limitations should be raised by special defense so that plaintiff may, in reply, plead section. 18 CS 143. Where defendant had room at Yale University and was absent therefrom only during summer vacation, his absence did not toll statute of limitations under section. 27 CS 394. Cited. 40 CS 6; 42 CS 187.
Sec. 52-591. When new action may be brought after time limited. When a judgment in favor of a plaintiff suing in a representative character, or for the benefit of third persons, has been reversed, on the ground of a mistake in the complaint or in the proper parties thereto, and, while the action was pending, the time for bringing a new action has expired, the parties for whose special benefit the action was brought may commence a new action in their individual names at any time within one year after the reversal of the judgment, if the original action could have been so brought.
(1949 Rev., S. 8331; P.A. 82-160, S. 250.)
History: P.A. 82-160 made minor changes in wording.
Cited. 214 C. 464; 225 C. 13; 234 C. 169.
Sec. 52-592. Accidental failure of suit; allowance of new action. (a) If any action, commenced within the time limited by law, has failed one or more times to be tried on its merits because of insufficient service or return of the writ due to unavoidable accident or the default or neglect of the officer to whom it was committed, or because the action has been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, or the action has been otherwise avoided or defeated by the death of a party or for any matter of form; or if, in any such action after a verdict for the plaintiff, the judgment has been set aside, or if a judgment of nonsuit has been rendered or a judgment for the plaintiff reversed, the plaintiff, or, if the plaintiff is dead and the action by law survives, his executor or administrator, may commence a new action, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, for the same cause at any time within one year after the determination of the original action or after the reversal of the judgment.
(b) When any action has been brought against an executor or administrator or continued against an executor or administrator after the death of the defendant and has failed for any of the causes listed in subsection (a) of this section, the plaintiff, or his executor or administrator in case a cause of action survives, may commence a new action within six months after the determination of the original action.
(c) If an appeal is had from any such judgment to the Supreme Court or Appellate Court, the time the case is pending upon appeal shall be excluded in computing the time as above limited.
(d) The provisions of this section shall apply to any defendant who files a cross complaint in any action, and to any action between the same parties or the legal representatives of either of them for the same cause of action or subject of action brought to any court in this state, either before dismissal of the original action and its affirmance or within one year after the dismissal and affirmance, and to any action brought to the United States circuit or district court for the district of Connecticut which has been dismissed without trial upon its merits or because of lack of jurisdiction in such court. If such action is within the jurisdiction of any state court, the time for bringing the action to the state court shall commence from the date of dismissal in the United States court, or, if an appeal or writ of error has been taken from the dismissal, from the final determination of the appeal or writ of error.
(e) The provisions of this section shall apply to any claim against the state for which a notice of claim has been properly and timely filed with the Office of the Claims Commissioner in accordance with sections 4-147 and 4-148 and which thereafter has been dismissed by the Office of the Claims Commissioner pursuant to section 4-142.
(1949 Rev., S. 8332; P.A. 79-267; P.A. 82-160, S. 251; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 50, 82; P.A. 98-20, S. 1, 2; Sept. Sp. Sess. P.A. 09-7, S. 30; P.A. 16-127, S. 28.)
History: P.A. 79-267 changed wording, referring to dismissal of action rather than erasure from docket and to setting aside of judgment rather than arrest of judgment and deleting reference to abatement of writs, to conform to changes in superior court rules; P.A. 82-160 reworded provisions and divided section into Subsecs; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 included reference to appellate court in Subsec. (c); P.A. 98-20 added Subsec. (e) making section applicable to certain claims against the state that have been dismissed by the Claims Commissioner pursuant to Sec. 4-142, effective April 24, 1998; Sept. Sp. Sess. P.A. 09-7 deleted reference to clerk of the Office of the Claims Commissioner, effective October 5, 2009; P.A. 16-127 amended Subsec. (e) by substituting “Office of the Claims Commissioner” for “Claims Commissioner”, effective June 9, 2016.
Original action held to have been defeated “for matter of form”. 56 C. 591; 108 C. 485. Does not apply to provision in insurance policy limiting right of action. 74 C. 514. Action for death by wrongful act is in statute. 91 C. 395; 102 C. 69. Is valid; authorizes continuance of suit begun in state court before dismissal of suit in federal court. 93 C. 412. Where action for death resulting from defendant's negligence is nonsuited, action can be recommenced within 1 year of date of nonsuit, although more than 1 year has elapsed from date of accident. 102 C. 69. Allegations of new complaint may set up different acts of negligence as long as cause of action remains the same. 108 C. 485. New action may substitute action under wrongful death statute of New York for original complaint erroneously counting on Connecticut wrongful death statute. Id., 444. Failure of officer to return writ to court is a default or neglect within statute. 116 C. 29. An appeal from a zoning board is not an “action” within statute. 126 C. 603. Modifies Sec. 52-555 if the circumstances bring the case within its terms. 134 C. 386. Defective appeal from nonsuit falls within section. 145 C. 99. Requirement that new action must be “for the same cause” explained. 148 C. 327. Appeal from architectural examining board not an “action” within meaning of section. 153 C. 124. Cited. 163 C. 388; 169 C. 646; 189 C. 401; 191 C. 150; 192 C. 301; 193 C. 28; 198 C. 229; 206 C. 491; 208 C. 230; 210 C. 175; Id., 721; 211 C. 431; 214 C. 464; 216 C. 11; Id., 412; 225 C. 13; 226 C. 831; 234 C. 169; 239 C. 265; Id., 574. Term “commenced”, as used in section to describe an initial action that “has failed . to be tried on its merits because of insufficient service”, cannot be construed to mean good, complete and sufficient service of process. 268 C. 541. Judgment of trial court rendered following arbitration pursuant to Sec. 52-549u is an action “tried on the merits” within the meaning of Subsec. (a). 341 C. 332.
Cited. 7 CA 245; 11 CA 156; 18 CA 515; 22 CA 625; 23 CA 404. Should not be construed so liberally as to render statutes of limitation virtually meaningless. 24 CA 239. Cited. 28 CA 653; 29 CA 132; 32 CA 187; 34 CA 732; 41 CA 297. Since section uses “action” and “cause of action”, and not “claim”, to refer to what is allowed to be brought under its provisions, trial court incorrectly concluded that savings provisions of section operate only to save the exact state law claims that were dismissed without prejudice in federal court, but do not permit the bringing of additional state law claims arising from same set of facts. 49 CA 715. Failure to return complaint for two and one-half years not diligent as required for application of statute. 50 CA 632. Second action improperly dismissed without affording plaintiff opportunity to present evidence on the issue of when he received notice of prior dismissal; plaintiff who fails to receive timely notice of dismissal of original action is not barred from pursuing the action pursuant to section. 68 CA 238. Plaintiff could not avail himself of statute where alleged breach of contract occurred in 1993, where the action had been dismissed for dormancy in 1997 and dismissed again in 1999 for failure to close the pleadings, and where plaintiff failed to file a motion to open that dismissal or to proffer any explanation for his conduct. 69 CA 614. Plaintiff must have commenced an original action before statute can be applied to save a subsequent action. 78 CA 235. Plaintiff not required to plead or prove that statute was applicable to his action because defendants had not raised a statute of limitations defense. Id., 783. Previous claims that were not tried on their merits not saved by statute because they were not commenced within time periods set forth in applicable statutes of limitations; previous action cannot qualify as “original action” for purposes of statute because action did not fail to be heard as matter of form, but as part of settlement by parties. 84 CA 1. “Action”, for the purpose of section, means a civil action commenced in a court of law, not an arbitration before a panel of arbitrators as an alternative to a civil action; Sec. 4-61 arbitration proceeding is not an action under section. 87 CA 367. Dismissal of prior case because of lack of attention and diligence of counsel does not qualify case for continuation of action through invocation of section. 99 CA 540. If found that the nature and extent of conduct that led to disciplinary dismissal involves excusable neglect, plaintiff is entitled to relief. 114 CA 244. There is no distinction, for purposes of taking advantage of section, between a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses its action because of want of jurisdiction and one whose action is dismissed because it has conceded lack of jurisdiction; dismissal for want of jurisdiction does not need to be the result of mistake or accident for section to apply. 116 CA 144. Dismissal of plaintiff's federal action without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted falls within the protection afforded by section. 131 CA 99. Section is not available to save plaintiff's untimely disability discrimination and retaliation claims because such claims involve a new cause of action that is separate from and would require a demonstration of conduct completely distinct from her previous race discrimination claims. 136 CA 759. Statute does not exempt plaintiff from two-year time limit for bringing a wrongful death action under Sec. 52-555 where previous action was brought in an individual capacity and present action is brought in an administrative capacity. 212 CA 147.
Cited. 15 CS 310; Id., 505. Allegations necessary to bring the matter within the purview of section should appear either by anticipation in the complaint or in the reply to a defense of the statute. 17 CS 3. Analogous to Sec. 52-125. Id., 409. Where plea in abatement is sustained, plaintiff may bring new action under section notwithstanding the statute of limitations. 18 CS 443. Cited. Id., 482; 20 CS 377. Obvious intention to make statute exceedingly broad and sweeping in scope; “any matter of form” refers to mode of procedure; statute remedial in character. 22 CS 207. Where plaintiff had brought a timely appeal under Sec. 12-118 which was nonsuited, he is not entitled to rely on this section to bring a new appeal on the same cause of action after the 2-month limitation had run, since the proceeding involving an appeal under Sec. 12-107c(d) is not the type of action which comes within the saving protection of this section. 26 CS 168. Cited. 29 CS 246; 33 CS 174. Fact that an abortive action was instituted in Connecticut to appoint an administrator does not invoke statute so as to shorten period of the general statute of limitation. 36 CS 121. Cited. Id., 269; 40 CS 266. Applies where service defeated by defendant's death, service was upon commissioner and plaintiff did not return the summons and complaint to court due to insufficiency of process. 50 CS 253.
Where default judgment was rendered for defendant in small claims session on failure of plaintiff to prosecute, default judgment was a “judgment of nonsuit” and plaintiff could commence new action under section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 3, 4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to pursue his action under statute presented under pleadings an issue of law properly determined by court upon defendant's motion for summary judgment. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 487. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 643, 694.
Cited. 192 C. 138. Specifically authorizes commencement of new action where prior action was dismissed for want of jurisdiction; Appellate Court judgment in 20 CA 223 reversed. 216 C. 11. “Original action” means first action filed within time allowed by applicable statute of limitations. Id., 412. Cited. 236 C. 701. Disciplinary dismissals are not excluded categorically from relief afforded by statute, and plaintiff claiming benefit of statute must be afforded opportunity to show that plaintiff's noncompliance with court order was due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. 243 C. 569. Applies to actions otherwise barred by applicable statute of limitations, does not operate to save plaintiff's action from contractual limitation period for bringing suit. 246 C. 378. Where a federal action and second state action were for same cause, federal action was the “original action”, i.e. first action filed within time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations; 216 C. 412 affirmed; policy of statute discussed. 250 C. 105. Appellate Court properly ruled that plaintiff's appeal of an initial action was moot because defendant acknowledged that Subsec. precluded any statute of limitations defense in the second action that wasn't applicable in the first action and therefore the first action, which only differed in the manner and date of service and the return date, was moot. 265 C. 650. Motion to cite in an additional defendant does not constitute a new “action” under Subsec. 299 C. 84. When a medical malpractice action has been dismissed pursuant to Sec. 52-190a(c) for failure to supply opinion letter by a similar health care provider required by Sec. 52-190a(a), plaintiff may commence an otherwise time barred new action pursuant to the matter of form provision of Subsec. only if that failure was caused by simple mistake or omission, rather than egregious conduct or gross negligence attributable to plaintiff or his attorney. 300 C. 33. Action dismissed for failure to provide a good faith certificate as required by Sec. 52-190a was not saved by this section where trial court found that the failure to supply certificate could not be said to be the result of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. 308 C. 338. Phrase “commenced within the time limited by law” includes the additional 30-day period for service by a marshal set forth in Sec. 52-593a; if defendant has actual notice within the 30-day period, savings provision of Subsec. would apply. 313 C. 516.
Plaintiff limited to bringing new action within 1 year from end of original action, not the last action. 11 CA 156. Not device for avoiding rules of res judicata. 28 CA 653. Dismissal due to party's pattern of delay can result in barring relief pursuant to Subsec. 62 CA 775. Plaintiff's original action was an “action” within meaning of Subsec. despite the fact that defendant named in that action had died prior to commencement of the action. 71 CA 697. Applicability of statute depends on particular nature of conduct involved, i.e., mere mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect vs. egregious conduct. 72 CA 601. Plaintiff's failure to object in a timely manner to motion to dismiss waives right to later challenge. 85 CA 746. Plaintiff may not take advantage of the accidental failure of suit statute following a judgment of nonsuit when plaintiff failed to comply with a court order to answer defendants' written discovery and was not the victim of a lawyer's errors because she was not represented by counsel concerning her litigation. 135 CA 506. Compulsory arbitration judgment rendered under Sec. 52-549z is an action “tried on its merits” for purposes of Subsec. (a), and Nunno v. Wixner, 257 C. 671, finding that compulsory arbitration was not a “trial” for purposes of Sec. 52-192a(c), does not control as the statutes at issue here and in Nunno have different purposes and are textually distinguishable. 200 CA 660.
A disciplinary dismissal that results from counsel for plaintiff's blatant and egregious conduct and refusal to comply with court orders is not intended to be condoned or sanctioned by the statute's matter of form provision. 52 CS 435; judgment affirmed, see 139 CA 88. Relief not available under Subsec. when conduct of plaintiff's attorney, in repeatedly ignoring the court's orders, went well beyond mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect and constituted a knowing, blatant and egregious disregard for the court and the rules of practice. 53 CS 220; judgment affirmed, see 147 CA 299.
Trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over federal due process claims not tried on the merits in the federal courts. 54 CA 178.
Sec. 52-593. Action against wrong defendant; allowance of new action. When a plaintiff in any civil action has failed to obtain judgment by reason of failure to name the right person as defendant therein, the plaintiff may bring a new action and the statute of limitations shall not be a bar thereto if service of process in the new action is made within one year after the termination of the original action. If service of process in the original action has been made upon an agent of the defendant named in the new action, or if the defendant in the new action is a corporation and service in the original action has been made upon an officer or agent of the corporation, notice of any claim for damage shall be sufficient if given in the original action, pursuant to statutory provisions, to any officer or agent of the defendant in the new action.
(1949 Rev., S. 8333; P.A. 82-160, S. 252.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.
Where defendant in second suit is a street railway company upon whom no process was served in original action, statute does not cure lack of statutory notice. 105 C. 96. New action may be brought within 1 year regardless of originally applicable statute of limitations. Id., 94; 109 C. 460. New action may set up different allegations if cause of action remains the same. 108 C. 444. Appeal from architectural examining board not a “civil action” within meaning of section. 153 C. 124. Cited. 169 C. 646; 183 C. 504; 191 C. 150; 214 C. 464; 225 C. 13; 234 C. 169. Where only one right person is named as defendant, failure to name all defendants from whom recovery is possible does not constitute failure to name the right person as defendant. 276 C. 1. Action was untimely and savings provision does not apply in municipal liability action under Sec. 52-557n because plaintiff could have recovered from defendants in original action, based on the factual allegations and causes of action in the original complaint. 315 C. 821.
Cited. 18 CA 515; 22 CA 625; 42 CA 345. Where plaintiff's suit against a state officer was dismissed due to immunity under Sec. 4-165, the 2-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-584 applies in subsequent suit against the state and the exception under this section for failure to name the right person as defendant does not apply. 62 CA 545. Plaintiff's action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as result of defendant's alleged negligence could not be saved from being time barred by statute because plaintiff named the proper party in his previous action which was not dismissed for failure to name the proper party but was stayed pending resolution in arbitration; statute applies only in circumstances in which plaintiff's original action failed by reason of naming the wrong defendant and such naming was the product of a reasonable and honest mistake of fact as to identity of the truly responsible individual. 67 CA 668. Plaintiff could not avail herself of statute's savings clause because dismissal of her first action was for dormancy, not for failure to name the right person as defendant. 72 CA 302. Plaintiff not eligible for relief under section since she withdrew her action in favor of a settlement and did not obtain judgment in the original action. 83 CA 843. Plaintiff's initial failure to name all presumptively factually correct defendants, whom plaintiff eventually did name, did not constitute failure to name the right person as defendant under section. 123 CA 583; judgment reversed on alternate grounds, see 306 C. 107. No exception to the principles of res judicata for an action brought under section. 165 CA 857.
Effect of section on statute of limitations where proper party was sued in corporate rather than individual name. 9 CS 307. The original action was terminated at the date judgments of nonsuit were rendered and not at the date of determination of later motions to set aside. 31 CS 302. Cited. 33 CS 176; 40 CS 266.
Sec. 52-593a. Action not lost where process served after expiration of limitation period. (a) Except in the case of an appeal from an administrative agency governed by section 4-183, a cause or right of action shall not be lost because of the passage of the time limited by law within which the action may be brought, if the process to be served is personally delivered to a state marshal, constable or other proper officer within such time and the process is served, as provided by law, within thirty days of the delivery.
(b) In any such case, the officer making service shall endorse under oath on such officer's return the date of delivery of the process to such officer for service in accordance with this section.
(1967, P.A. 890; P.A. 82-160, S. 253; P.A. 88-317, S. 29, 107; P.A. 00-99, S. 116, 138, 154; P.A. 01-195, S. 66, 181; P.A. 03-224, S. 14; P.A. 10-36, S. 11; 10-178, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 88-317 inserted “Except in the case of an appeal from an administrative agency governed by section 4-183,” at the beginning of Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1989, and applicable to all agency proceedings commencing on or after that date; P.A. 00-99 replaced reference to officer with state marshal and deleted provision re personal delivery to sheriff in Subsec. (a) and made technical changes in Subsec. (b), effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-195 substituted “state marshal” for “officer” in Subsec. (b), effective July 11, 2001; P.A. 03-224 increased time period for service of process from 15 to 30 days in Subsec. (a) and made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective July 2, 2003; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “state marshal authorized to serve the process” with “state marshal, constable or other proper officer within such time” and amended Subsec. (b) to replace “state marshal” with “officer” and “state marshal's” with “officer's”, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 10-178 made identical changes as P.A. 10-36.
Cited. 170 C. 5; 191 C. 150; 214 C. 464. “Process to be served” must be delivered to marshal within applicable limitations period, and such delivery is not complete until marshal is given instruction to effectuate service. 294 C. 673. Endorsement requirement in Subsec. (b) is directory rather than mandatory, and Subsec. (a) embodies the substance of section. 328 C. 172. Subsec. (a): Successfully faxing process to the state marshal for service satisfies the personal delivery requirement and is consistent with the section's remedial purpose. 335 C. 138.
Cited. 10 CA 14; 43 CA 397. Action commences on date that process was delivered to sheriff for service, if defendant is served within 15 days of delivery to the sheriff. 53 CA 725. Delivery by mail is not precluded under section, the purpose of which is to ensure that process is received on time by the officer, but the determinative standard under section is when the marshal receives the process, not when it is mailed. 136 CA 67. Action saved from dismissal because marshal had original summons and complaint in his possession the day before the statute of limitations expired and process was served within 30 days of delivery; failure of marshal to include date of delivery in the return was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. 154 CA 146. Section applies to civil actions and not probate appeals. 173 CA 788. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that process was “personally delivered” to state marshal when transmitted to marshal's office by fax machine. 174 CA 285; judgment reversed, see 335 C. 138. Section is not implicated in habeas actions because, in a habeas action, service of process does not occur until after a petition is filed in court for a preliminary review, the court determines that the petition pleads a nonfrivolous claim upon which relief can be granted and over which the court has jurisdiction, and the writ issues. 212 CA 628.
Appeal to court from decision of administrative agency is cause of action within meaning of section. 33 CS 172. Service of process which came into hands of deputy sheriff by mail was personally delivered to him within meaning of section. Id., 677. Cited. 34 CS 565; 40 CS 299; 41 CS 425; 42 CS 187.
Sec. 52-594. Limit for executor or administrator to bring personal action that survives. If the time limited for the commencement of any personal action, which by law survives to the representatives of a deceased person, has not elapsed at the time of the person's death, one year from the date of death shall be allowed to his executor or administrator to institute an action therefor. In computing the times limited in this chapter, one year shall be excluded from the computation in actions covered by the provisions of this section.
(1949 Rev., S. 8334; P.A. 82-160, S. 254.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.
See Sec. 52-555 re actions for injuries resulting in death.
See Sec. 52-584 re limitation of action for injury to person or property.
Effect of statute. 90 C. 611. Cited. 191 C. 150; 214 C. 464; 223 C. 14.
Cited. 3 CA 602; 43 CA 397.
Cited. 8 CS 362. Statute does not reduce the time within which an action might have been brought had plaintiff survived; it adds 1 year from the date of death to the time otherwise allowable. 15 CS 434. Where 1-year period with respect to antemortem injuries had not expired when decedent died, his personal representative, under section, had year from date of death to institute action. 28 CS 461.
Sec. 52-595. Fraudulent concealment of cause of action. If any person, liable to an action by another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence of the cause of such action, such cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against such person so liable therefor at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon first discovers its existence.
(1949 Rev., S. 8335.)
This was previously the rule in equity proceedings. 19 C. 438. Fraudulent concealment affects surety on bond. 66 C. 64. Statute does not apply to action by receivers against directors of bank for negligence. 89 C. 451. Suspends running of statutes until right is discovered. 93 C. 558. Must be pleaded specially. 143 C. 31. Cited. 188 C. 301; 189 C. 162; 191 C. 150; 198 C. 660; 207 C. 204; 214 C. 242; 232 C. 527. To prove fraudulent concealment, plaintiffs must show that defendant had actual awareness, rather than imputed knowledge, of the facts necessary to establish plaintiffs' cause of action, intentionally concealed these facts from plaintiffs, and concealed the facts for purpose of obtaining delay on plaintiffs' part in filing a complaint on their cause of action. 281 C. 84.
Cited. 7 CA 245; 15 CA 496; Id., 677; 16 CA 108; 19 CA 16; 31 CA 235. Plaintiff's burden of proof under section discussed. 53 CA 102. In the absence of a fiduciary duty, there must be some fraudulent action beyond breaching one's contractual duty to toll the statute of limitations. 207 CA 707
Cited. 17 CS 198; 42 CS 187.
Sec. 52-596. Actions for payment of remuneration for employment. No action for the payment of remuneration for employment payable periodically shall be brought but within two years after the right of action accrues, except that this limitation shall be tolled upon the filing with the Labor Commissioner of a complaint of failure to pay wages pursuant to the provisions of chapter 558.
(1949 Rev., S. 8336; P.A. 80-182.)
History: P.A. 80-182 added exception re filing of complaint for failure to pay wages with labor commissioner.
Does not apply to severance pay which is not within description of “payment of remuneration for employment payable periodically”. 155 C. 680. Cited. 214 C. 464.
Cited. 11 CA 375; 16 CA 232; 43 CA 435. Payments must occur at regular intervals to qualify as periodic payments. 96 CA 673.
Sec. 52-597. Action for libel or slander. No action for libel or slander shall be brought but within two years from the date of the act complained of.
Cited. 214 C. 464.
Defamation count barred by section; federal prison mailbox rule not recognized. 154 CA 138.
Sec. 52-598. Execution or action upon judgment for money damages. Motion to revive judgment. (a) No execution to enforce a judgment for money damages rendered in any court of this state may be issued after the expiration of twenty years from the date the judgment was entered and no action based upon such a judgment may be instituted after the expiration of twenty-five years from the date the judgment was entered, except that there shall be no time limitation on the issuance of such execution or the institution of such action if the judgment was rendered in an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by sexual assault where the party legally at fault for such injury was convicted of a violation of section 53a-70 or 53a-70a.
(b) No execution to enforce a judgment for money damages rendered in a small claims session may be issued after the expiration of ten years from the date the judgment was entered, and no action based upon any such judgment may be instituted after the expiration of fifteen years from the date the judgment was entered.
(c) With respect to a judgment for money damages rendered in any court of this state, including, but not limited to, a small claims session, a motion to revive such judgment may be filed with the Superior Court prior to the expiration of any applicable period of time to enforce such judgment as set forth in this section. The court may grant the motion to revive the judgment if the court finds that the applicable time period to enforce the judgment under this section has not expired. No order to revive a judgment may extend the time period to enforce a judgment beyond the applicable time period set forth in this section.
(1953, S. 3234d; P.A. 76-59, S. 2; P.A. 77-452, S. 32, 72; P.A. 82-160, S. 255; P.A. 84-317, S. 1, 3; P.A. 02-138, S. 22; P.A. 09-215, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 76-59 essentially replaced previous provisions which simply stated “No action based upon a judgment for money damages which has been rendered in any court of this state shall be instituted after the expiration of 21 years from the date of such judgment, provided no payments have been made on the same during such period”; P.A. 77-452 removed reference to “court of common pleas” small claims sessions in exception, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 84-317 increased the time limitation on executions to enforce judgment for money damages rendered in small claims court from 5 to 10 years from date judgment was entered and institution of action based on any such judgment from 10 to 15 years from date judgment was entered; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception eliminating time limitation if judgment was rendered in action for damages caused by sexual assault where party legally at fault was convicted of violating Sec. 53a-70 or 53a-70a; P.A. 09-215 added Subsec. (c) re motion to revive judgment.
Cited. 15 CA 752; 38 CA 44; 45 CA 543. Subsec. (c) is a procedural statute that confers continuing jurisdiction on the court, and may properly be applied retroactively. 132 CA 192; judgment affirmed, see 309 C. 840.
Sec. 52-598a. Limitation of action for indemnification. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter, an action for indemnification may be brought within three years from the date of the determination of the action against the party which is seeking indemnification by either judgment or settlement.
Cited. 41 CA 686; 46 CA 699.